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7 2 21 
INDIVIDUALIZING CRIMINAL LAW’S JUSTICE JUDGMENTS: 
SHORTCOMINGS IN THE DOCTRINES OF CULPABILITY, MITIGATION, AND EXCUSE 
 




In judging an offender’s culpability, mitigation, or excuse, there seems to be 
general agreement that it is appropriate for the criminal law to take into account 
such things as the offender’s youthfulness or her significantly low IQ. There is even 
support for taking account of their distorted perceptions and reasoning induced by 
traumatic experiences, as in battered spouse syndrome. On the other hand, there 
seems to be equally strong opposition to taking account of things such as racism or 
homophobia that played a role in bringing about the offense. In between these two 
clear points, however, exists a large collection of individual offender characteristics 
and circumstances for which there is lack of clarity as to whether the criminal law 
should take them into account. Should our assessment of an offender’s criminal 
liability be adjusted for their cultural background? Their religious beliefs? Their past 
life experiences? The pedophilic tendencies they have always had but usually 
suppressed? 
The question of how much to individualize the criminal liability judgment is 
not peripheral or unusual but rather common in a wide range of formal criminal law 
doctrines including, for example, the culpability requirements of recklessness and 
negligence, the mitigation of provocation and its more modern form of extreme 
emotional disturbance, and the excuse defenses of mistake as to a justification, 
duress, and involuntary intoxication. indeed, it turns out that the problem of 
individualizing factors is present, if often obscured, in all criminal law doctrines of 
culpability, mitigation, and excuse. 
The Article reviews the appeal of criminal law adhering to a purely objective 
standard, where the problem of the individualizing factors is sought to be avoided 
altogether. But the resulting stream of injustices has forced most jurisdictions to 
adopt a partially individualized standard in some cases involving some doctrines. 
But this leaves the jurisdiction’s criminal law in an awkward and unstable state. 
Without a guiding principle for determining which individualizing factors are to be 
taken into account under what circumstances, the law is inevitably unprincipled and 
internally inconsistent. And without guidance, different decision-makers inevitably 
come to different conclusions in similar cases. 
The Article proposes a solution to the individualizing factors puzzle and a 
statutory codification that would provide guidance in the adjudication of the many 
cases in which the issue arises. 
_______________ 
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 An offender provoked to kill because of racial prejudice, bad temper, or homophobia 
ought not be able to claim a defense or mitigation based on that belief or disposition, most 
would agree.1 The offender is to be judged by the objective standard of the reasonable person, 
who has no such weaknesses and would not have been so provoked. On the other hand, when 
a battered spouse kills her sleeping husband mistakenly but honestly believing that this is the 
only means of protecting herself from serious injury or death, should we similarly judge her by a 
purely objective standard? Or should we judge her by the standard of the reasonable person 
who has suffered the same battered spouse syndrome effects as she has? The latter approach – 
partially-individualizing the objective standard – may provide her an excuse or mitigation based 
upon a conclusion that from her perspective she reasonably believed her killing was necessary 
 
1 See generally CYNTHIA LEE, MURDER AND THE REASONABLE MAN: PASSION AND FEAR IN THE CRIMINAL COURTROOM (2003); Jody 
D. Armour, Race Ipsa Loquitur: Of Reasonable Racists, Intelligent Bayesians, and Involuntary Negrophobes 46 STAN. 
L. REV. 781 (1994); Stephen P. Garvey, Self-Defense and the Mistaken Racist, 11 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 119 (2008); Mark 
Kelman, Reasonable Evidence of Reasonableness 17 CRITICAL INQUIRY 798 (1991); Victoria Nourse, A Comment on 
Switching, Inequalilty, and the Idea of the Reasonable Person, 2 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 361 (2004); Kenneth Simons, 
Self-Defense, Mens Rea, and Bernhard Goetz, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1179 (2989); Richard Singer, The Resurgence of 
Mens Rea: II – Honest but Unreasonable Mistake of Fact in Self Defense, 28 B.C. L. REV. 459 (1987); Michael Vitiello, 
Defining the Reasonable Person in the Criminal Law: Fighting the Lernaean Hydra, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1435 
(2010); Peter Westen, Individualizing the Reasonable Person in the Criminal Law, 2 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 137 (2008). 
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self-defense,2 while the former approach – the purely objective standard – would deny the 
defense, judging her conduct to be an unreasonable claim of self-defense.3 
 While the criminal law has good reason to impose an objective standard in assessing 
liability, it must partially individualize the standard in many cases in a wide range of doctrines if 
it is to truly do justice. To always insist upon an objective standard is to assure a continuing 
stream of injustices, which certainly desert retributivists would find appalling and even crime-
control utilitarians ought to reject because it would undermine the criminal law’s moral 
credibility with the community and thereby reduce its crime-control effectiveness.4 
 On the other hand, how are we to decide what characteristics or circumstances ought to 
be used in what situations as individualizing factors?5 If a documented history of lifelong bad-
temperedness arising from an upbringing in a uniformly bad-tempered family ought not qualify 
as an individualizing factor, then why should the effects of battered spouse syndrome? By what 
principles are we to distinguish what ought and ought not be taken into account? Even the 
thoughtful Model Penal Code drafters, who recognized the importance of partial 
individualization, confessed an inability to articulate a workable principle and concluded that 
they would simply “leave the issue to the courts.”6 
 The Model Code drafters are not alone. In focusing upon a wide range of doctrines, 
many scholars view the individualization problem as perhaps unsolvable. “Given the 
importance of assessing negligence and heat of passion in criminal law, one would think that 
courts and commentators would agree on which individual traits of an actor are incorporated 
into the heuristic of a ‘reasonable person,’” Peter Westen, has observed. “The reality, however, 
is the opposite. Courts and commentators despair of being able to determine 
which individual traits of an actor are taken into account in assessing his reasonableness.”7 
Other commentators have been even more forceful in their critiques of attempts at rational 
solution, especially those built around the “reasonable person” standard. In the 2001 case 
Regina v. Smith, Lord Hoffman called the reasonable person test “logically unworkable” and an 
“opaque formula.”8 “A recurring problem ... is the difficulty of how much to ‘individualize’ the 
reasonable person – how to determine which characteristics of the defendant (physical traits, 
emotional dispositions, past experiences, beliefs, etc.) should be imported into this ‘reasonable 
person,’” Jonathan Whitmer-Rich agrees, calling the reasonable person formulation a “deep, 
 
2 See, e.g. People v. Wilson, 487 N.W.2d 822, 825 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992); State v. Hennum, 441 N.W.3d 793, 799 
(Minn. 1989). 
3 See, e.g. People v. Humphrey, 921 P.2d 1, 8-9 (Cal. 1996); State v. Peterso, 857 A. 2d 1132, 1150 (Md. Ct. Spec. 
App. 2004); Boykins v. State, 995 P.2d 474, 476 (Nev. 2000); State v. Kelly, 685 P.2d 564, 570 (Wash. 1984). 
4 See Section I.B. infra. 
5 See, e.g. People v. Romero, 69 Cal. App. 4th 846, 848 (Ct. App. 1999) (holding that the trial court was correct in 
reusing to permit expert testimony offered by the defense on “the role of honor, paternalism, and street fighters 
in the Hispanic culture,” because “we are not prepared to sanction a ‘reasonable street fighter standard’”). 
6 Amer. L. Inst., Comment to § 2.02, at 242 (1985) (“The standard for ultimate judgment invites consideration of 
the ‘care that a reasonable person would observe in the actor’s situation.’ There is an inevitable ambiguity to 
‘situation.’ If the actor were blind or if he had just suffered a blow or experienced a heart attack, these would 
certainly be facts to be considered in a judgment involving criminal liability, as they would be under traditional law. 
But the heredity, intelligence or temperament of the actor would not be held material in judging negligence, and 
could not be without depriving the criterion of all its objectivity. The code is not intended to displace 
discriminations of this kind, but rather to leave the issue to the courts”); id., Comment to § 210.3, at 62 (“the word 
‘situation’ is designedly ambiguous”). 
7 Peter Westen, Individualizing the Reasonable Person in Criminal Law, 2 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 137, 139 (2008). 
8 Regina v. Smith (Morgan James), [2001] 1 AC 146, 117-119 (House of Lords) (Lord Hoffman).  
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conceptual problem.”9  Mayo Moran has described the individualization problem as, 
“somewhat tortured, even ridiculous,” explaining that the catch-22 of individualization is that 
its weaknesses are most obvious in those cases where individualization is most necessary.10 
Christopher Jackson concludes that it is impossible to conceive of an a priori method of 
distinguishing relevant characteristics from irrelevant ones when trying to tackle the 
individualization problem.11 Angela Harris writes that making sense of the individualization 
problem is “less plausible today” than it was in the 1970s. And, finally, Andrew Taslitz has 
asserted that deciding liability along the lines of individualization is a “noble aspiration” that 
“can never fully be achieved.”12 
 Perhaps worse, the absence of any guiding principle in dealing with the question of 
proper individualization is not just a scholarly problem but also the basis for regularized 
inconsistencies in the daily workings of the criminal justice system. Consider a few examples. 
 A twenty-year-old, developmentally disabled man in Maryland has sex with a thirteen-
year-old girl after she and her friends trick him into believing she is sixteen. At trial, he is barred 
from introducing evidence of the circumstances surrounding his mistake as to the girl’s age, and 
he is sentenced to five years in prison.13 Meanwhile in California, when a thirty-four-year-old 
man who has sex with a seventeen-year-old believing her to be over eighteen, is charged with 
statutory rape, the court allows him to introduce evidence regarding the circumstances 
supporting the reasonableness of his mistake. He is sentenced to two years of probation.14  
 Two women with battered woman’s syndrome are pressured by their respective 
abusers to sexually assault their children. One lives in Pennsylvania; the other New Jersey. At 
trial, the Pennsylvania court refuses to allow evidence of the woman’s abuse to be considered 
by the jury, and the woman is sentenced to twenty years in prison.15 But the New Jersey court 
admits expert testimony on battered woman’s syndrome allowing the woman to successfully 
argue that she acted under duress.16 She is sentenced to just two years in prison. 
 A homeless man in New York is kicked in the head while he sleeps in a cardboard shelter 
that he has constructed for himself. He stabs the person who kicked him, killing him, and at trial 
is permitted to make a self-defense claim under the Castle Doctrine.17 He is given a suspended 
sentence and released on probation. Meanwhile, a homeless man in California is threatened by 
a meth-addled man in front of his regular sleeping spot, and strikes and kills the man.18 At trial, 
he is not permitted to offer the defense claim made by his New York counterpart, and he is 
sentenced to eleven years in prison. 
 
9 Jonathan Witmer-Rich, The Heat of Passion and Blameworthy Reasons to be Angry 55 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 409, 411-
412 (2018). 
10 MAYO MORAN, RETHINKING THE REASONABLE PERSON: AN EGALITARIAN RECONSTRUCTION OF THE OBJECTIVE STANDARD 303 
(2003). 
11 Christopher Jackson, Reasonable Persons, Reasonable Circumstances 50 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 651, 653 (2013). 
12 Angela Harris, Rotten Social Background and the Temper of the Times 2 AL. CIV. RTS. & CIV. LIB. L. REV. 131, 134-135 
(2011); Andrew Taslitz, The Rule of Criminal Law 2 AL. CIV. RTS. & CIV. LIB. L. REV. 79, 80-81 (2011). 
13 Garnett v. State, 332 Md. 571, 632 A.2d 797 (1993). 
14 People v. Hernandez, 391 P.2d 673 (1964). 
15 Com. v. Ely, 578 A.2d 540 (1990). 
16 State v. B.H., 834 A.2d 1063 (App. Div. 2003). 
17 Nikita Stewart & Jan Ransom, He Said He Stabbed a Student to Defend His Home. His Home Is a Box N.Y. TIMES 
(Jan. 15, 2020) https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/15/nyregion/homeless-stabbing-college-students.html.  
18 People v. Sotelo-Urena, 4 Cal. App. 5th 732 (2016). 
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 A New Mexico man who served in the Vietnam War kills two of his supervisors at work 
and tries to argue that his war-related post-traumatic stress disorder caused his actions.19 
However, the man is not allowed to introduce evidence of the effects of his military service, and 
receives a life sentence. Meanwhile, in Illinois, a Vietnam veteran who shot his foreman after a 
dispute at work similarly claims that his PTSD caused him to behave as he did. At trial, he is 
permitted to introduce evidence regarding his combat duty and the ways in which the noises in 
his work environment triggered traumatic memories.20 The man is found not guilty.  
 Without some general agreement on how issues of individualization should be resolved, 
the criminal justice system is destined to repeat an endless string of such inconsistencies in 
adjudication. After examining the problem and reviewing the current law treatment of it, this 
Article proposes an answer to the partial-individualization puzzle. While it may be true that one 
cannot identify a list of factors to be excluded and a list of factors to be included – our justice 
judgments are too nuanced for that, too dependent on situation and the interaction of factors – 
it is possible to provide some rather specific guidance for decision-makers judging a specific 
case. The article proposed a statutory provision that would guide such individualization 
decision-making.  
 Part I examines the attractions of the objective standard, its hidden costs, the problem 
with a purely subjective standard, and examines the conceptual boundaries of the 
individualization problem. Part II catalogs the many doctrines of culpability, mitigation, and 
excuse in which the individualization problem arises and illustrates the challenges of 
individualization with a series of real-world cases. Part III offers a proposed solution to the 
individualization challenge that would apply across the full range of doctrines in which such 
problems appear, and also provides a proposed statutory formulation to guide juries and other 
decision-makers. Finally, Part IV, building upon the analyses in the earlier sections, shows that 
the same individualization problems so widely debated actually arise in essentially all doctrines 
of culpability, mitigation, and excuse, but is simply obscured in many. 
 
I. The Attractions and Complications of a Purely Objective or Subjective Standard 
 
 The use of objective standards in assessing criminal liability has a long history21 and is 
meant to serve an important purpose.22 Unfortunately, its common current use produces a 
stream of avoidable injustices leaving one to wonder why use of an objective standard is so 




19 State v. Simonson, 669 P.2d 1092 (N.M. 1983). 
20 People v. Wood, No. 80-7410 (Cir. Ct. of Cook County Ill. 1982). 
21 See R. v. Jones (1703) 6 Mod. 105, 87 Eng. Rep. 232 (the case widely regarded as the origin of the “reasonable 
person standard” in the criminal law, where the Queen’s Bench refused to convict a trickster who deceived a man 
with such an obvious ruse that the court decided the trickster’s conduct could not possibly be criminal. Deceit 
would only be criminal if it were “such a cheat as a person of an ordinary capacity can’t discover,” the court held). 
22 JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 493 (8th ed., 2018) (“The more subjective the standard becomes, the 
greater the risk that the normative message of the criminal law will be lost. At some point, a defendant’s real claim 
seemingly is not that he is acting justifiably, but rather that he should be excused because he has done the best he 
can, given his unusual mental or emotional characteristics”). 
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A. The Attraction of an Objective Standard 
 
 For centuries, Anglo-American criminal law has expressed a clear preference for defining 
individual criminal liability with an objective standard of reasonableness.23 It is easy to see why. 
First, consider the purposes for which criminal law is designed. It is in large part a 
communicative tool to tell people what they cannot do, or are required to do, under threat of 
criminal punishment.24 Where the law takes into account “the infinite varieties of 
temperament, intellect, and education which make the internal character of a given act so 
different in different men,” it may not be able to clearly and effectively communicate to the 
public what they are prohibited from doing or what they must do.25 In other words, people 
cannot guide their behavior according to a standard that is so particularized that they are 
unsure whether or not it applies to them. In that sense, objectivity is crucial to the legibility of 
the criminal law for everyday application by the ordinary person.26   
 Further, as a practical matter, people will be more able to apply the criminal law rules to 
the situation at hand when the rules themselves are more objective, especially when the actor 
must make a quick decision.27 Applying the law is often challenging even for intelligent, 
 
23 George P. Fletcher, The Right and the Reasonable 98 HARV. L. REV. 949, 949 (1985); see generally MAYO MORAN, 
RETHINKING THE REASONABLE PERSON (2003) (explaining that objective concepts of reasonableness pervade American 
and English law). 
24 ANTONY DUFF & ROBERT ALEXANDER DUFF, PUNISHMENT, COMMUNICATION, AND COMMUNITY 141-142 (2001). 
25 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 108 (1938). 
26 Compare, for example, the German and American versions of the self-defense justification. The German 
formulation provides “Whoever commits an act in self-defense does not act unlawfully. Self-defense means any 
defensive action which is necessary to avert a present unlawful attack on oneself or another.”   Section 32: Self-
Defense German Criminal Code, Nov. 13, 1998 (Federal Law Gazette I, p. 3322). This articulation of self-defense 
applies where its requirements are objectively fulfilled.  Tatjana Hörnle, Social Expectations in the Criminal Law: 
The Reasonable Person in a Comparative Perspective 11 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 1, 11 (2008). Where an actor is 
threatened by a present, unjustified attack, and defensive action is necessary to avert that attack, an actor is 
entitled to carry out an active defense, even if it is potentially deadly. Id. The American formulation, however, is far 
less straightforward, providing that “The use of force upon another person is justifiable when the actor believes 
that such force is immediately necessary for the purpose of protecting himself against the use of unlawful force...a 
person employing protective force may estimate the necessity thereof under the circumstances as he believes 
them to be when the force is used.” MPC 3.04(1), (3)(c). By consulting the actor’s beliefs and estimations, the 
standard’s requirements appear more opaque and uncertain, and it is less clear what the criminal law is 
attempting to communicate to the public. George P. Fletcher, The Right and Reasonable, 98 HARV. L. REV. 949, 955 
(1985). Which beliefs and estimations are appropriate and which aren’t? Will a combat veteran’s estimation of the 
necessity of force be viewed in the same light as the estimation of an octogenarian who has been skittish all his 
life? This highly subjectivized standard, focusing on the actor instead of the act, might be confusing to would-be 
perpetrators. So, the more objective the description in the criminal law, the clearer the prohibition. 
27 Consider, for example, the case of a black man who purchases a home for his family in a predominantly white 
suburb in Maryland in the 1970s. Law v. State, 21 Md. App. 13, 318 A. 2d 859 (Md. App. 1974). Shortly after 
moving in, the man’s home is broken into a by racist neighbors who take significant amounts of personal property 
in order to communicate their discontent with a black family living next door. On another night, when the man 
hears what he believes to be someone trying to unlock his back door and break in again, he grabs his gun and 
prepares to shoot the would-be perpetrator through the door. He must act quickly; any delay might allow the 
person outside to get into the house. Perhaps, though, just as he’s aiming his gun, he begins to doubt whether the 
law permits him to shoot the person. Maybe he knows that a self-defense justification would allow him to protect 
himself in his home without retreating, but this intruder is technically outdoors, on the other side of the door. 
Would he still be permitted to shoot? Or maybe he knows that self-defense requires an imminent threat, but the 
person outside does not seem to be armed or particularly violent. Perhaps the intruder is not really an intruder, 
but is just lost or confused? If that’s the case, and the homeowner guesses wrong, is his conduct still lawful? 
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thoughtful adults.28 If appropriate standards of conduct are not clearly defined in objective 
terms, people will struggle to apply the rules, rendering them unable to quickly and effectively 
respond to threats or to avoid mistakes.29 Objective rules, then, work better to tell people what 
they can, cannot, and must do on a particular occasion.30  
 Still further, in judging criminal liability for violations, purely objective criteria are more 
likely to provide uniformity in application by different decision-makers.31 The objective 
standard promotes what is a most fundamental feature of the America law – that “to apply the 
law justly to different cases is simply to take seriously the assertion that what is to be applied in 
different cases is the same general rule.”32  
 Finally, an objective standard seems to best embody democratic principles: everyone 
ought to be bound and judged by the same legislatively-provided criminal law rules.33 To allow 
different rules for different people, because of the exercise of judicial discretion, for example, 
can too easily produce unjustified disparity between similar cases and shelter unfair bias that 
may privilege one person or group over another.34 The Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal 
Protection Clause was written in part to ensure a criminal code applied equally to everyone 
regardless of race or ethnicity or other such factor.35 Further, the Supreme Court has held that 
the government “may not ... selectively deny its protective services to certain disfavored 
minorities without violating the Equal Protection Clause.”36 Thus, where criminal law standards 
endorse subjectivity by taking into account defendants’ diverse backgrounds, for example, they 
risk violating fundamental notions of equal protection.37 
Some have explained that they endorse an objective standard as a means of ensuring 
that the standard remains grounded in external criteria that are accessible to everyone.38 These 
writers argue that the concept of reasonableness, for example, relies on prevailing social norms 
and therefore should not stray from the common knowledge of every citizen.39 As one 
commentator explains, the advantage of the objective standard is that “each member of the 
community is held equally to one standard of conduct: that of a reasonable person.”40 
Professor George Fletcher, who devoted much of his work to comparing the American and 
German reasonable person standards, has argued that objectivity allows for universalizable 
 
Making the wrong choice about how to apply the criminal law to the situation at hand could result in the 
homeowner’s death or his imprisonment. 
28 Paul H. Robinson, Rules of Conduct, Principles of Adjudication 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 729, 730 (1990). 
29 Id. at 731. 
30 Id. at 732. 
31 Id. at 770. 
32 H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF THE LAW 156-57 (1961). 
33 STEPHANOS BIBAS, THE MACHINERY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 64 (2012).  
34 Charles Ostrom et al., Judges and Discrimination: Assessing the Theory and Practice of Criminal Sentencing U.S. 
D.O.J. REPORTS (Feb. 2004) https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/204024.pdf.  
35 Doriane Lambelet Coleman, The Liberal’s Dilemma 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1130-31 (1996) 
36 DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 197 n. 3.  
37 PAUL BREST & SANFORD LEVINSON, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING: CASES AND MATERIALS 437-38 (2d ed. 
1992). 
38 See, e.g. Robert Unikel, Comment, “Reasonable” Doubts: A Critique of the Reasonable Woman Standard in 
American Jurisprudence, 87 Nw. U. L. Rev. 326, 329 (1992) (explaining that men are ill-equipped to judge the 
perspective of a “reasonable woman” or a “reasonable battered woman” and should not be required to do so). 
39 Id. at 367. 
40 Lauren Goldman, Note, Nonconfrontational Killings and the Appropriate Use of Battered Child Syndrome 




standards that can be relied upon by future actors in similar circumstances to guide their 
conduct accordingly.41 A subjectivized claim, in contrast, offers no possibilities for 
transmutation into widely applicable doctrine as it is limited to the specific personal 
characteristics of a single individual.  
In light of these myriad attractions, it is not surprising that so many scholars have 
expressed support for exclusive use of an objective standard. 
 
B. Hidden Costs: Regularized Injustice and Undermining Effective Crime-Control 
 
 Against these benefits of an objective standard are several significant costs, which have 
not always been understood or appreciated. Namely, a purely objective standard will produce a 
constant stream of injustices, as those offenders who cannot reasonably be expected to meet 
the objective standard are nonetheless held criminally liable. For these individuals, an 
ostensibly neutral standard is unfair because it asks them to rise to a level of conduct of which 
they are not realistically capable.  
Compare, for example, two cases of statutory rape from the 1970s. In the first case, the 
offender is a twenty-year-old man named Raymond Garnett who has an intellectual disability 
and a tested IQ of 52.42 Garnett’s teachers report that he has the emotional and cognitive 
maturity of a middle schooler. One evening, he meets a thirteen-year-old girl who lives in his 
neighborhood – functionally, his own age – and the girl and her friends tell Garnett that she is 
sixteen years old. Over the next several months, the two become very close, and one night the 
girl helps Garnett climb into her bedroom window. They talk for hours and at one point engage 
in consensual sexual intercourse. After the girl’s mother finds out, Garnett is arrested for 
statutory rape.  
In the second case, a fifteen-year-old girl runs away from home and moves in with a 
twenty-nine-year-old man named Brent Walker who she met while both were employed at a 
supermarket.43 She tells Walker that she is nineteen-years-old. The pair have consensual sex 
more than seventy-five times. Ultimately, a detective looking for the girl on behalf of her 
parents finds her at Walker’s apartment and Walker is charged with statutory rape. In both 
cases, the court holds that a mistake of age defense is unavailable. Both men are convicted of 
the same offense and receive the same sentence. But are the two similar enough to be treated 
identically?  
In the first case, the young man has an intellectual disability, he is the same age 
emotionally and cognitively as the girl, he believes he is just four years older than her, and he 
has sex with her just one time. Given his disability, it is not clear that we reasonably could have 
expected him to have understood and avoided the offense. In the second case, the man is not 
disabled, he is 14 years older than the girl, and he has sex with her more than seventy-five 
times. In the first case, the man is at best negligent with respect to the girl’s age – if he has any 
culpability at all – and in the second case, the man is certainly reckless if not knowing with 
respect to the girl’s age. Treating the two cases uniformly under an objective, reasonable 
person standard does not mete out punishment in accordance with blameworthiness 
proportionality. As Edwin Keedy noted in 1908 about cases like Garnett, “such a result is 
contrary to fundamental principles and is plainly unjust, for a man should not be held criminal 
 
41 George P. Fletcher, The Individualization of Excusing Conditions, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 1269, 1304 (1974). 
42 Garnett v. State, 632 A.2d 797, 798 (1993). 
43 Walker v. State, 768 A.2d 631, 632 (2001). 
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because of lack of intelligence.”44 Rather, as Keedy proposed, the criterion should be whether 
the defendant “did his best according to his own lights,” or, more plainly, did the defendant act 
up to his own standard?45  
Retributivists would obviously oppose liability and punishment disproportionate to 
blameworthiness.46 But crime-control utilitarians should also be concerned about such results 
of applying a purely objective standard because the stream of injustices that it produces will 
incrementally undermine the criminal law’s moral credibility with the community, and in turn, 
reduce the public’s willingness to comply with criminal law, to defer to its demands, and to 
internalize its norms.47  
The utilitarian crime-control opposition to such injustices want to logically follow from 
two discrete dynamics: first, doing injustice as the community perceives it undermines the 
criminal law’s moral credibility; second, such reduced moral credibility reduces the 
community’s willingness to defer, acquiesce, and comply with the criminal law’s commands and 
to internalize its norms.48  
The first dynamic – that the perceived moral credibility of the criminal law depends on 
the degree to which it tracks ordinary people’s intuitions of blameworthiness – is fairly 
commonsensical. That is, where the justice system imposes criminal liability and punishment 
that is significantly greater or lesser than the ordinary person would think appropriate, it loses 
moral credibility with the community. This commonsense proposition has strong foundations in 
empirical research.49  
The second part of the crime-control dynamic follows from the fact that a reduction in 
the perceived moral credibility of the justice system reduces the criminal law’s ability to gain 
compliance, deference, and internalization of its norms. The archetypal example of this 
dynamic is the U.S. Prohibition era of the early 20th century. In 1920, Congress prohibited the 
sale, manufacture, and transportation of alcohol within the U.S. with the passage of the 
Eighteenth Amendment. Demand for alcohol remained high, however, and illegal stills, 
bootlegging operations, and speakeasies flourished. Even government officials openly ignored 
 
44 Edwin Keedy, Ignorance and Mistake in the Criminal Law 22 HARV. L. REV. 75, 84, (1908). 
45 Id. at 85. 
46 See generally IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE (J. Ladd trans., 1865); IMMANUEL KANT, THE 
PHILOSOPY OF LAW (W. Hastie translation 1887); MICHAEL S. MOORE, PLACING BLAME (1997); JEFFRIE G. MURPHY, GETTING 
EVEN (2003); Mitchell N. Berman, Two Kinds of Retributivism, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CRIMINAL LAW 433 (RA 
Duff & Stuart P. Green eds., 2011); Joshua Dressler, Hating Criminals: How Can Something That Feels So Good Be 
Wrong?, 88 Mich. L. Rev. 1448 (1990); Jean Hampton, Correcting Harms Versus Righting Wrongs: The Goal of 
Retribution, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1659 (1992); Herbert Morris, Persons and Punishment, 52 MONIST 475 (1968). 
47 Paul H. Robinson, The Ongoing Revolution in Punishment Theory: Doing Justice as Controlling Crime 42 ARIZ. ST. L. 
J. 1089, 1093 (2011). 
48 Paul H. Robinson & Lindsay Holcomb, In Defense of Moral Credibility (forthcoming 2022). 
49 See, e.g., Jean Landis & Lynne Goodstein, When Is Justice Fair? An Integrated Approach to the Outcome Versus 
Procedure Debate 11 AM. BAR FOUND. RESEARCH J. 675, 685 (1986) (finding that “routine departures from legalistic 
principles of due process create in the consumer a sense of injustice that undermines the legitimacy of legal 
authorities and thereby allows justification for past criminal activity and increases the likelihood of future 
criminality”); Casper et al., Procedural Justice in Felony Cases 22 L. & SOC. REV. 438, 487-488 (1988) (finding that 
defendants had more confidence in the outcome of their case and trust in the criminal justice system where they 
felt that their sentence was fair); JONATHAN CASPER, AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE: THE DEFENDANT’S PERSPECTIVE xii (1972) 
(finding that the effect of plea bargaining was to undercut the moral authority of the criminal justice system and 
contribute to defendant cynicism); Tracy Meares et al., Lawful or Fair? How Cops and Laypeople Perceive Good 
Policing 105 J. OF CRIM. L. AND Criminology 297, 321 (2015) (finding that the perceived legitimacy of policing is based 
how people see officers exercising their authority and how professional they appear). 
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the Prohibition rules. The public displays of disrespect for the criminal law reinforced public 
disillusionment with it, and not just disrespect for the Prohibition rules. It also reduced 
compliance with criminal law rules unrelated to alcohol.50 The point is that a diminution in 
criminal law’s moral credibility with the community prevents the law from harnessing the 
powerful crime-control forces of social influence and internalized norms, thereby reducing the 
criminal law’s crime-control effectiveness.51  
 There exist many other real-world examples of the disillusionment-compliance 
connection. Consider the 1960s Watts neighborhood of Los Angeles, where violations of the 
criminal law were increasingly met with charges and sentences that seemed to residents grossly 
disproportionate. The aggressive policing and punishment did not reduce crime, as intended, 
but rather increased it,52 as the criminal law’s credibility within the neighborhood increasingly 
weakened. (In August 1965, this tension came to a boiling point after a Watts resident’s violent 
encounter with the police inspired the community to take to the streets. An official 
investigation of the Watts riots conducted by the California Governor found that the riot was a 
result of the Watts community’s long-growing grievances and discontent with criminal law 
enforcement.53) 
 To give an example relevant to our recent pandemic, in 1918, as the Spanish Flu swept 
through the United States, communities across the country instituted a number of public health 
measures to slow the spread. Foremost among these was mask wearing.54 However, many 
people were unpersuaded that the inconvenience and the intrusiveness of the government 
action was justified by its supposed health benefits. When some local governments imposed 
mandatory mask ordinances and punished those who flouted the law with jail terms and 
fines,55 many in the community resisted, seeing the mask mandates as excessive and the 
punishments unfair. This sparked protests en masse and widespread distrust of the legal 
system. In fact, irritated as they were by the mask ordinances and their associated criminal 
penalties, people took more and more liberties, hosting large gatherings, and refusing to wear a 
mask properly (or refusing to wear a mask at all) even when under the scrutiny of officers.56 
 
50 PAUL ROBINSON & SARAH ROBINSON, PIRATES, PRISONERS, AND LEPERS: LESSONS FROM LIFE OUTSIDE THE LAW 139-163 (2015). 
51 For a general discussion, see Robinson & Holcomb supra note 47. 
52 See James Queally, Watts Riot: Traffic Stop Was the Spark that Iggnited Days of Destruction in L.A. L.A. TIMES (July 
29, 2015) https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-watts-riots-explainer-20150715-htmlstory.html 
(explaining that “Anger and distrust between Watts’ residents, the police, and city officials had been simmering for 
years” and that many Watts residents suggested that the “riot had been triggered by long-smoldering resentment 
against alleged police brutality”); see also Elizabeth Hinton, From the War on Poverty to the War on Crime 108 
(arguing that “haphazard, undisciplined, and aggressive police response only spawned an ever-more-violent 
reaction” and police warned that aggressive policing had backfired by “starting guerilla war in the streets”). 
53 Watts Riot, CIV. RIGHTS DIGITAL LIB. (last modified Jan. 7, 2021) http://crdl.usg.edu/events/watts_riots/?Welcome.  
54 James Rolph, Proclamation of Mayor Asks Masks For All, S.F. CHRONICLE at 8 (Oct. 22, 1918) 
https://quod.lib.umich.edu/f/flu/1620flu.0009.261/1/--proclamation-of-mayor-asks-masks-for-
all?rgn=full+text;view=image;q1=conscience%2C+patriotism+and+self-
protection+demand+immediate+and+rigid+compliance. San Francisco Mayor James Rolph told citizens, 
“Conscience, patriotism and self-protection demand immediate and rigid compliance;”) John Davie, Wear Mask, 
Says Law, Or Face Arrest, OAKLAND TRIB. at 9 (Oct. 25, 1918) https://quod.lib.umich.edu/f/flu/8540flu.0007.458/1/--
wear-mask-says-law-or-face-arrest?rgn=full+text;view=image;q1=Face+Arrest (Oakland Mayor John Davie 
explained to his constituents: “It is sensible and patriotic, no matter what our personal beliefs may be, to 
safeguard our fellow citizens by joining in this practice.” 
55 J. Alexander Navarro, Mask Resistance During a Pandemic Isn’t New – In 1918 Many Americans Were “Slackers” 
MICHIGAN HEALTH (Oct. 29, 2020) https://healthblog.uofmhealth.org/wellness-prevention/mask-resistance-during-a-
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Crimes in other areas of life rose as well; prostitution expanded as did drug consumption, and 
attacks on immigrants.57 Without buy-in from the community generally, greater enforcement 
served only to provoke greater resistance and reduced compliance. 
This dynamic between disillusionment with the criminal law and a failure to comply with 
the criminal law’s demands has been confirmed by ample controlled social psychology studies, 
wherein even small incremental loss in moral credibility has been shown to produce a 
corresponding incremental loss in deference and compliance.58 Consider, for example, a study 
using a within-subjects design in which subjects were asked a number of questions relating to 
various ways in which moral credibility is thought to affect deference, compliance, and the 
internalization of the law’s norms. Will a citizen assist police by reporting a crime? Will they 
assist in the investigation and prosecution of a crime? Do people take the imposition of criminal 
liability and punishment as a reliable sign that the defendant has done something truly 
condemnable? Do people take the extent of the liability imposed as a reliable indication of the 
seriousness of the offense and the blameworthiness of the offender? Subjects were tested on 
these issues, then, with a baseline established, subjects were disillusioned with the criminal law 
by exposing them to the system’s failures of justice and perpetrations of injustice. Later 
retesting showed that the measures of deference, compliance, and internalization of norms had 
all decreased among the disillusioned subjects.59  
A follow-up study used a between-subjects design, giving different levels of 
disillusionment to three different groups and then testing their levels of deference, compliance, 
and internalization.60 The results confirm the conclusions of the earlier within-subjects design: 
The greater the disillusionment, the greater the loss in deference, compliance, and 
internalization. A third study analyzing responses in pre-existing large datasets came to a similar 
conclusion using regression analysis.61 Studies by other researchers have confirmed this 
relationship between criminal law’s moral credibility with the community and its influence on 
the community’s behavior. As one writer concludes, “Overall, participants appeared less likely 
to give the law the benefit of any doubt after reading cases where the law was at odds with 
their intuitions.”62  
The studies show that people’s judgments about justice are highly nuanced, and even 
minor shifts in criminal law’s moral credibility produce correspondingly minor shifts in 
community deference to it.63 This is a particularly important finding because it means that no 
matter the current state of a criminal justice system’s moral credibility with the community, any 
incremental reduction in credibility can produce an incremental reduction in deference – and 
any increase can produce an increase in deference. 
A wide variety of other kinds of studies support similar findings. For example, a 2002 
study on the flouting thesis – the idea that the perceived justice of one law can influence 
compliance with unrelated laws – found that rules regarded as unjust have “subtle but 
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63 Paul Robinson, Geoffrey Goodwin & Michael Reisig, The Disutility of Injustice 85 N.Y.U L. REV. 1940 (2010); Paul 
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pervasive influences on people’s deference to and respect for the law.”64 A 2003 study on the 
reasons why taxpayers obey, rather than simply evade taxes, found that trust in the legal 
system had a strong effect on compliance.65 A 2008 study of Swedish alcohol consumption 
found that there was a correlation between low institutional trust and illegal alcohol 
consumption.66 And a 2009 study using survey data from a number of African countries to 
model the relationship between institutional trustworthiness and deference found that “the 
more trustworthy and fair the government, the more likely its population will develop 
legitimating beliefs that lead them to accept the government’s right to make people obey its 
laws and regulations.”67 
 As these examples show, doing injustice or failing to do justice – punishing people 
significantly more or less than the community believes they deserve – creates the conditions for 
further criminality. Where the community comes to believe that the justice system is unjust, 
they will become less willing to defer, acquiesce, and comply with the criminal law’s commands 
and to internalize its norms. 
 
C. The Problem of Complete Individualization 
 
 While strict adherence to an objective standard can lead to unjust results that threaten 
both retributive and utilitarian goals, over-individualization can be equally problematic. First, an 
overly individualized standard rests on a determinist account of human action to which the rest 
of the criminal law does not adhere. A purely subjective account can only be claimed to be 
exculpatory if one sees an individual’s actions as inescapably determined by the person’s beliefs 
and dispositions that constitute her character.68  
Consider for example the Colorado Supreme Court’s endorsement of the over-
individualized standard in a self-defense case from the 1960s. There, the judges held, “The right 
of self-defense is a natural right and is based on the natural law of self-preservation. Being so, it 
is resorted to instinctively in the animal kingdom by those creatures not endowed with intellect 
and reason, so it is not based on the ‘reasonable man’ concept.”69 Under this perspective, the 
offender is seen as unable to have acted in any other way. Regardless of how unreasonable the 
person’s conduct might seem to the average person, the overly individualized standard would 
excuse any act that the defendant predictably committed given his or her character and 
beliefs.70 In the case of self-defense, for example, such a standard would focus solely on 
whether the actor “did honestly believe that it was necessary to use force in his own 
defense.”71  
 
64 Janice Nadler, Flouting the Law: Does Perceived Injustice Provoke General Non-Compliance? NORTHWESTERN L. & 
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Health Survey 2006, 8 BMC PUBLIC HEALTH 283 (2008). 
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The rest of the criminal law does not operate on these terms, however. People are 
presumed to have the capacity to guide their conduct according to rational choices. As Stephen 
Morse writes, “The law properly treats persons generally as intentional creatures and not as 
mechanical forces of nature ... Otherwise, law and morality as action-guiding normative 
systems of rules would be useless, and perhaps incoherent.”72 A person’s beliefs, desires, and 
dispositions certainly play a role in his or her conduct, but they are not the sole causes of a 
person’s conduct. Rather, criminal liability is founded on the notion that individuals are able to 
control the causal influence of some of their characteristics, and that despite immense internal 
pressures telling them to behave in a certain way, they are often able to choose to act 
otherwise.  
 Beyond the philosophic inconsistencies of an over-individualized standard, the fully-
individualized standard is as out of touch with the community’s intuitions of justice as is the 
fully-objective standard. Rather than over-punishing offenders who appear largely blameless, as 
the strictly objective standard does, a purely subjective standard risks under-punishing 
offenders who the community believes are blameworthy but who, as a result of their personal 
characteristics and honest beliefs, are let off the hook for their offense.  
Consider for example the famous case of the “subway vigilante” Bernhard Goetz.73 
Goetz, a white man, lived in New York City in the 1980s and was mugged twice.74 Fearing for his 
life, Goetz purchased a handgun and began carrying it with him, despite having no permit.75 
One afternoon, while riding on the subway, Goetz was approached by a group of four young 
black men, one of whom asked Goetz how he was doing. Goetz understood the question as the 
prelude to a mugging.76 The young men had three sharpened screwdrivers but did not openly 
display them.77 When one asked Goetz for money, Goetz pulled his gun and began shooting as 
the young men scattered.78 Finding one, Darrell Cabey, sprawled on a seat uninjured, Goetz 
said “You look okay, have another,” and shot at him again, leaving him permanently 
paralyzed.79 Goetz argued that he shot in self-defense, believing that he faced impending 
physical harm if he did not comply with their demands for money.80 While this might have been 
a plausible claim with regard to the initial shooting, it hardly seems plausible with regard to his 
subsequent shooting of Cabey, who no longer presented a threat to him.81 
Goetz was indicted by a grand jury, but the trial court overruled the indictment on the 
belief that the prosecution erred in instructing the grand jury that the test for self-defense was 
whether the defendant’s conduct was that of a reasonable man in the defendant’s position.82 
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Instead, the court argued, the proper standard was purely subjective in that reasonableness 
was to be determined exclusively from the perspective of the defendant’s individual beliefs.83 
The Appellate Court affirmed the dismissal, explaining that a better jury instruction would have 
asked the jury to base their decision on “what this defendant himself, subjectively, had reason 
to believe – not what some other person might reasonably believe,” considering how all of the 
circumstances surrounding the encounter “appeared to this defendant.”84 After Goetz was later 
successfully indicted and prosecuted, the Court of Appeals subsequently disavowed the purely 
subjective view, writing instead that “such an interpretation defies the ordinary meaning and 
significance of the term ‘reasonably.’”85  
A variety of bizarre beliefs and conditions that transcend legitimate notions of 
blamelessness or mitigation have been claimed by defendants, sometimes successfully, and 
under a purely subjective view these were all have to be taken as a serious basis for adjusting 
the standard of conduct. One man, for example, obtained a mitigation from murder to 
manslaughter after claiming that his wife’s constant ridiculing of him, including making him 
sleep on the floor, drove him to beat her to death with a wrench.86 Elsewhere, a woman 
obtained an acquittal on drunk driving charges after claiming that hormonal changes caused by 
pre-menstrual syndrome drove her to commit disruptive and reckless acts.87 A teenager who 
murdered an 82-year-old woman claimed a mitigation for “television intoxication” that he said 
brainwashed him into becoming more violent.88 And a man charged with rape argued that he 
was so influenced by the 1939 film Gone With the Wind that he fully believed that sex should be 
spontaneous, and that a woman who resists at first will eventually willingly give in if pushed 
hard enough.89 Under a completely subjective standard, these claims and the countless other 
questionable individualizing claims that have been raised in real cases, might well be granted. 
But mitigation in such cases with which the vast majority of the public would likely not 
sympathize undermines both retributive and utilitarian goals of punishment.  
Principles of desert require defendants to make efforts to resist law-breaking even if 
they have impulses toward criminality that are not experienced by the average person.90 The 
criminal law is premised on action-guiding principles wherein people are understood to be 
capable of moderating their own behavior in order to remain on the side of lawfulness.91 It is 
the people who make little to no effort at self-control, or who consciously disregard the rules of 
conduct, that appear most blameworthy and deserving of punishment.92 In that sense, claims of 
mitigation or excuse, which rely on personal biases – such as racism, homophobia, or misogyny 
– or which rely on bizarre phobias, pseudoscientific medical conditions, or media consumption 
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serve only to diminish and mock the important role that individualization can play in cases like 
the intellectually disabled statutory rapist, described above, or the woman who kills her violent 
husband after he has abused her for years.  
It is important to note, however, that hateful beliefs, on the one hand, and phobias or 
quasi-pathological idiosyncrasies, on the other, are not to be regarded equivalently. While 
rejection of the former is based on a normative claim, asserting that the most insidious, 
loathsome views should never provide a basis for exculpation or mitigation for fear that such 
might be taken as approving or accepting the beliefs, the latter is an observation that absurd 
beliefs and pseudo-medical conditions should not be taken into account because they have 
insufficient effect in reducing blameworthiness. The larger point here is that a purely subjective 
standard would include all of these cases – both the hateful and the ridiculous – within its 
ambit, considering them on equal grounds, and ought to be rejected. 
 
D. The Scope of the Problem: Rules of Conduct Versus Principles of Adjudication 
 
  How broad is the challenge of resolving the fundamental tension in criminal law 
between reliance upon an objective or subjective standard? Is the project so overwhelming in 
scope that it is beyond practical resolution? One important distinction among criminal law 
doctrines dramatically reduces the size of the problem and makes its resolution considerably 
more feasible.  
 Criminal law has two distinct functions: providing ex ante rules of conduct and setting 
out ex post principles of adjudication.93 And each criminal law rule, or piece of a rule, serves 
either one function or the other. One could pull these two kinds of roles apart to create a 
separate code of conduct and a code of adjudication.94 (Indeed, this is an exercise that has 
already been done.95) 
 The rules of conduct define offenses in terms of objective conduct and circumstance 
elements. They describe not only what conduct is prohibited, but also what conduct is 
required.96 They also describe, in the context of justification defenses, when a person is 
permitted to engage in conduct that is otherwise prohibited.97 Killing another is normally a 
violation of the rules of conduct but doing so when is necessary to defend against an unlawful 
aggressor is not a violation of the conduct rules. The principles of adjudication, in contrast, set 
out the minimum culpability requirements for offenses liability, as well as providing doctrines of 
excuse that provide a defense even if all offense requirements are satisfied.98 The graphic 
below provides a simplified illustration of how these doctrines interrelate. 
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 Rules of conduct and principles of adjudication differ in their aims. While rules of 
conduct strive to be clearly understood and easily recalled by the public, principles of 
adjudication are often complex and nuanced in order to accurately capture the public’s 
intuitions of justice.99 This difference suggests that these two aspects of a criminal code press 
for different kinds of formulations: one is blunt and clear-cut, while the other is necessarily 
filled with variables and subjectivity.100 
  The distinction between the ex ante rules of conduct and the ex post principles of 
adjudication is important for our present inquiry regarding individualization factors because, it 
must now be clear, the individualization problem exists only with regard to the latter group of 
doctrines, doctrines of ex post adjudication. These criminal law rules, embodied in offense 
culpability requirements, formal offense mitigations, and complete excuse defenses, represent 
only a subset of criminal code provisions, which makes the scope of the individualization 
problem more limited and focused than it would otherwise be.  
 
II. Current Law’s Attempts to Deal with the Individualization Problem 
 
 How does current criminal law handle the tension between an objective and a fully-
individualized standard that arises in principles of adjudication: culpability requirements, 
statutory mitigations, and excuse defenses? Unfortunately, it’s record is at best mixed. In many 
if not most jurisdictions, the law adopts a purely objective standard in a wide variety of 
doctrines, ignoring even powerful individualization factors that significantly reduce the 
offender’s blameworthiness, as illustrated in Section II.A. below. Some jurisdictions do attempt 
to partially individualize the objective standard at least with regards to some adjudication 
doctrines, as illustrated in Section II.B. This partial individualization frequently avoids what 
 




would otherwise be potentially serious injustice, but unfortunately the partial-individualization 
effort is incomplete and ad hoc. The need for more complete guidance on the issue of 
individualization is illustrated by Section II.C, which gives examples of individualizations that 
should probably be universally excluded from consideration, such as racism or homophobia, 
even though defense counsel might well be able to argue that they played a significant role in 
bringing about the offense and arguably should be seen as reducing the actor’s 
blameworthiness. The most obvious conclusion from this review of current law’s treatment of 
individualization factors is its serious inconsistency and unpredictability, both among different 
jurisdictions and within a single jurisdiction, demonstrating the criminal law’s lack of guidance 
on how individualization factors should be dealt with. 
 
A. Objective Limitations on Adjudication Doctrines 
 
Outlined below are five cases in which offenders were tried and convicted under an 
objective standard despite their efforts to introduce individualizing factors that could have 
significantly reduced the judgment of their blameworthiness. The cases span a variety of 
criminal law doctrines in which the notion of the objective “reasonable person” has been 
invoked, including negligence, provocation, and mistaken self-defense. Each case results in an 
unsatisfactory outcome in which a defendant is punished without regard for their personal 
circumstances and psycho-social history. Not only do these cases fail to provide just deserts, 
but they diminish the moral credibility of the justice system by holding offenders to standards 
they cannot meet.  
 Negligence. Walter Williams and his wife Bernice Williams are both members of the 
Shoshone Native American tribe and both are fairly uneducated.101 The couple’s seventeen-
month-old child cries constantly, has swelling in his cheeks, runs a high fever, and an odor 
comes from his mouth.102 The Williamses discuss taking their son to the doctor but decide to 
wait, giving him aspirin in the interim.103 They are wary of seeking medical care because it is not 
uncommon for government social workers to separate Native American children from their 
families and put them into foster homes with non-Native American parents.104 Eleven days 
after he first showed symptoms, the child dies.105 His autopsy reveals that an abscessed tooth 
developed into a gangrenous infection, which would have been preventable had the parents 
sought medical care.106 The Williamses are charged with manslaughter for negligently failing to 
provide proper medical care for their son.107  
The trial court finds the couple guilty.108 On appeal, the couple argues that they did not 
willfully fail to provide necessary medical attention.109 The appeals court, however, offers only 
an objective standard of negligence explaining that negligence “describes a failure to exercise 
the ‘ordinary caution,’” where ordinary caution is “the kind that a man of reasonable prudence 
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would exercise under the same or similar conditions.”110 The notion of “reasonable prudence” 
is narrowly construed, allowing no space to take into account the Williams’ education, cultural 
upbringing, or reasons for distrust of Child Protectve Services.111 As the court explains, “If the 
conduct of a defendant, regardless of his ignorance, good intentions, and good faith, fails to 
measure up to the conduct required of a man of reasonable prudence, he is guilty of 
negligence.’”112 Though Walter and Bernice had only the best of intentions, as they loved their 
child dearly, the Court of Appeals upholds the conviction for manslaughter.113  
The case of Raymond Garnett, described above,114 provides another example of a 
defendant whose lack of sophistication raises doubts about the propriety of the criminal 
liability imposed. Recall that Garnett has an intellectual disability that leaves him often 
confused and struggling to comprehend social cues.115 At age 20, he is introduced to a thirteen-
year-old girl who, along with her friends, tells Garnett she is sixteen.116 Garnett is cognitively 
about her age. The girl helps Garnett sneak into her bedroom and the two spend the night 
talking, which eventually leads to consensual intercourse.117 (For both, it is their first time.) 
Nine months after the encounter, the girl gives birth to a baby, and Garnett is arrested and 
convicted of statutory rape.118  
Imagine that Garnett had lived in New Mexico,119 Alaska,120 or California121 where courts 
have adopted the view, based either on legislation or judicial decision, that a reasonable 
mistake of age can be introduced as a defense to statutory rape. Using a purely objective 
standard, these states ask how the defendant’s conduct compares to that of the reasonable 
person. Alaskan courts, for example, provide the defense where the mistake is not negligent – 
that is, where the actor does not perceive a risk that their sexual partner is underage, and the 
failure to perceive such risk is not a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable 
person would observe in the actor’s situation.122 But Garnett, with his cognitive disabilities, 
does not perceive the risk of an underage partner that the reasonable person would have 
perceived. Despite the fact that Garnett could not meet the reasonable person standard, he 
would be held liable for a negligent mistake as to age in these jurisdictions.123 
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 Provocation. Like negligence doctrine, provocation cases commonly rely upon an 
objective standard. Consider, for example, the case of John Gounagias, a recent immigrant 
living in a small, tightly knit Greek community in Washington.124 One night Gounagias’ 
roommate notices Gounagias in a drunken state and, as Gounagias lies helpless, the roommate 
sodomizes him.125 The next day, the roommate brags openly about his humiliation of 
Gounagias.126 Everywhere Gounagias goes, he is tormented by the suggestive gestures and 
crude remarks.127 Humiliated and having severe headaches, Gounagias’ frustration builds.128 
Three weeks after the incident, after one particularly cruel bout of public humiliation at the 
local coffeeshop, Gounagias storms out to find the man who raped him and shoots him while 
he is sleeping.129 Gounagias is charged with murder.130 
At trial, Gounagias argues that he was provoked by the assault and the repeated taunts, 
which caused him to become “sick” and “enraged.”131 The court applies a fixed rule that too 
much time has passed between the sexual assault and his homicidal response.132 Gounagias is 
held to an objective standard, which provides that provocation can only be a mitigation where 
it has a “reasonable tendency to produce sudden and uncontrollable anger ... in an ordinary 
man.”133 Excluding from the trial evidence that Gounagias’ post-rape life had been turned into a 
series of jeers and humiliations from his only acquaintances in the United States, the court 
convicts him of first-degree murder and sentences him to life in prison.134 
 Mistaken Self-Defense. Perhaps more than any other criminal law doctrine, mistaken 
self-defense cases allow courts to affect significant injustice where they hold a marginalized 
defendant to an objective standard that fails to appreciate the complexities and challenges of 
the offender’s personal situation and experiences. Consider, for example, the case of Vladimir 
Sotelo-Urena, a homeless man in California.135 When homeless shelters are overcrowded, 
Sotelo-Urena commonly has no choice but to sleep on the streets.136 One night, while sleeping 
in a park, Sotelo-Urena is attacked by three men who stab him several times.137 He is 
traumatized by the incident and begins to carry a kitchen knife with him for self-defense, 
increasingly afraid that someone will hurt him.138 A few weeks later, Sotelo-Urena is once again 
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forced to sleep on the streets. When a man from a nearby homeless encampment who is high 
on methamphetamines approaches him and asks if he has a cigarette in what Sotelo-Urena 
perceives as a threatening, aggressive manner,139 Sotelo-Urena pulls out his knife and warns 
the man to leave him alone.140 He sees the man reach into his pocket and believing that he is 
reaching for a weapon, Sotelo-Urena stabs him, killing him.141 He is charged with first degree 
murder.142  
At his trial Sotelo-Urena tries to argue that he was acting in what he honestly believed 
was self-defense, explaining that his previous violent encounter had primed him to see 
potential danger in many interactions.143 He attempts to submit expert testimony to the fact 
that “homeless individuals experience a heightened sensitivity to perceived threats of violence” 
as a result of their higher rates of victimization.144 The trial court, however, holds that Sotelo-
Urena’s experiences are irrelevant to the question of self-defense.145 The issue was not 
whether Sotelo-Urena was homeless, the court argues, but rather “what risk did he face that 
anybody would face behind the library ... at night?”146 In support of his decision to hold Sotelo-
Urena to the objective, reasonable person standard, the judge further explains, “Everyone is 
subject to the same risks. I don’t think it’s a subject for expert opinion.”147 Sotelo-Urena is 
denied any mitigation or excuse, is convicted of first-degree murder, and sentenced to twenty-
six years to life in prison.148  
 A similarly troubling case in which an objective standard excludes consideration of 
personal experiences with violence when making a claim of self-defense is that of Garland 
Hampton.149 He is raised in a violent, impoverished home in a tough neighborhood in 
Milwaukee.150 From the age of two, his home existence is sufficiently chaotic and dangerous 
that Child Welfare Services begin monitoring the household.151 At age six, Hampton witnesses 
his mother shoot another woman, and at nine years old he sees her shoot and kill her 
boyfriend.152 Child Welfare Services moves Hampton to his grandmother’s home in the same 
neighborhood, but she is equally violent.153 She threatens to shoot Hampton for the slightest 
mistake and beats him regularly.154 Hampton spends most of his early childhood living in fear, 
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believing that the slightest disagreement can turn fatal.155 At fifteen, he begins carrying a gun 
for self-protection. One night, Hampton accuses his friend of stealing money from him, and the 
two begin to argue. Hampton’s friend draws his gun and begins waving it at Hampton, shouting 
at him. Fearing that the dispute will turn fatal, as so many other altercations that he has 
experienced have, Hampton draws his own gun and shoots his friend, killing him.156 Hampton is 
charged with first degree murder and waived into adult court.157  
Hampton tries to argue that he was acting out of an honest belief in the need for self-
defense, as one could reasonably expect given his “psycho-social history.”158 The court holds 
such evidence legally irrelevant and inadmissible.159 Instead, the court instructs the jury that 
the reasonableness of Hampton’s beliefs should be judged according to the standard of a 
“person of ordinary intelligence and prudence under all the circumstances existing at the time 
of the offense.”160 Upon that instruction, the jury finds Hampton guilty of first-degree murder, 
and he is sentenced to life in prison.161  
As the Williams, Garnett, Gounagias, Sotelo-Urena, and Hampton cases show, where we 
treat defendants with life-distorting backgrounds or limited capacities acting under trying 
circumstances as identical to an idealized reasonable person, we perpetuate injustice.  
 
B. Partially Individualizing the Objective Limitations 
 
 While use of a purely objective standard can fail to provide just deserts in a wide variety 
of doctrines, use of a partially-individualized standard can avoid such injustice. Below, four 
cases spanning an array of self-defense and duress scenarios demonstrate how a partially-
individualized standard can be essential to doing justice. Such a standard rejects what H.L.A. 
Hart deemed the “sociologically very naïve” conclusion that there is a “single homogeneous 
social morality whose mouthpiece the judge can be in fixing sentence, and in admitting one 
thing and rejecting another as a mitigating or aggravating factor.”162 Rather, it takes the 
offender as she is, with all of her diverse capacities, experiences, and beliefs, and asks what she 
realistically could or could not have done in the particular circumstances with which she was 
presented. 
 Mistaken Self-Defense. Consider, for example, the case of Patrick Croy, a Native 
American living on Shasta tribal territory in California.163 In this part of California, negative 
stereotyping against Native Americans is widespread.164 As a child, Croy witnesses the local, 
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white police force treat his family and friends with enormous disrespect, taking men and boys 
into custody for trivial infractions and beating them aggressively while they are detained.165 By 
the time he is an adult, Croy not only distrusts the local police but is terrified of them.166 One 
night, when Croy is twenty-two, he and his friends go to a nearby store.167 Croy’s friends get 
into a fight with the store clerk, while Croy waits in the car.168 When the group leaves, the store 
clerk points to Croy’s car and tells a nearby police officer to “get them.”169 Without asking 
further questions, the officer heads off in pursuit.170 Croy has no idea why the police are 
following him but believing that the police operate with relative impunity in their dealings with 
the native community, he does not want to pull over and find out.171 Someone in Croy’s car 
fires a shot at the police car, and soon twenty-seven police officers, all of whom are white, are 
tailing Croy’s car.172 The officers open fire, and Croy’s sister is hit by a bullet.173 At one point, 
Croy gets within feet of one of the officers, and is shot in the back and arm. Croy responds by 
shooting the officer in the chest, killing him.174 
 At trial, Croy is prevented from introducing evidence about the relationship between 
whites and Native Americans in the county where he was raised.175 He is convicted of first-
degree murder, attempted murder, conspiracy, and assault with a deadly weapon, and is given 
the death penalty.176 Croy appeals, arguing that he did not intentionally seek to kill the police 
officer, but rather was acting in self-defense because experience had shown him that white 
police officers tend to target Native Americans.177 The California Supreme Court finds that 
evidence of such fear is relevant to Croy’s conduct.178 On remand, Croy’s lawyers are permitted 
to introduce evidence regarding the history of race relations between whites and Native 
Americans in the county.179 Jurors are invited to “put themselves in Croy’s shoes.”180 A number 
of experts testify to the ongoing discrimination that Native Americans face, thereby creating a 
subjective framework within which the jurors could understand Croy’s conduct.181 Finally, on 
direct examination Croy walks the jury through his thought process leading up to the shooting, 
explaining, “I realized that all the things my grandmother and father had told us were coming 
true, and they were going to kill us all.”182 Drawing a connection between Croy and the legacies 
of violence and mistrust that characterized relations between whites and Native Americans in 
the county, the jury finds Croy not guilty on all charges.183   
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 For another example, consider the case of Janice Leidholm, a woman living with her 
husband on a rural farm in North Dakota.184 Her husband is an alcoholic whose drinking binges 
frequently result in physical violence targeted at his wife.185 Leidholm is beaten to the point of 
unconsciousness on more than one occasion.186 Over time, the abuse gets so frequent that 
Leidholm feels compelled to find a way out.187 She suggests to her husband that they go to 
marriage counseling, but he refuses; she calls the sheriff’s office and seeks information about 
entering a shelter, but she is unable to escape; finally, desperate, she tries unsuccessfully to 
commit suicide.188 One night, Leidholm and her husband are driving home when he tries to 
push her out of the car while it is moving at 45 miles per hour.189 Leidholm’s daughter saves her 
mother by pulling her back into the car.190 Once home, Leidholm attempts to call the sheriff, 
but each time she dials the phone, her husband pushes her to the ground.191 After fighting for 
hours, Leidholm’s husband falls asleep.192 Leidholm, believing that it is her only available means 
of saving herself, grabs a kitchen knife and stabs her husband twice in the chest, killing him.193 
Leidholm is charged with first degree murder.194 
At trial, Leidholm argues that she acted upon an honest belief that her conduct was 
necessary self-defense.195 North Dakota’s objective standard of self-defense holds that “if a 
person has an actual and reasonable belief that force is necessary to protect himself against 
danger of imminent unlawful harm, his conduct is justified.”196 The court wavers on the issue of 
reasonable belief.197 Leidholm’s husband was asleep when she stabbed him, so a factfinder 
might reasonably discern that force was not necessary to subdue him.198 Taking into account 
the extraordinary violence that Leidholm endured, the court determines that a partially 
subjective standard should be employed.199 Under the partially-individualized standard, the 
court writes, the issue is “whether the circumstances are sufficient to induce in the accused an 
honest and reasonable belief that he must use force to defend himself against imminent 
harm.”200 The court stresses the importance of understanding the situation from the standpoint 
of a person with the mental and physical characteristics of the defendant, who “sees what the 
accused sees and knows what the defendant knows.”201 As a result, Leidholm is permitted to 
introduce evidence of battered spouse syndrome, and ultimately, her liability is reduced from 
murder to manslaughter.202 To reject such a partially-individualization standard would be to 
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exclude as irrelevant the history of battering and the resulting distorted reasoning that are at 
the core of Leidholm’s belief in the necessity for her act.203 
 A final example is the case of James Law, a black man who in 1973 moves with his family 
to a predominantly white neighborhood in suburban Maryland.204 Law is greeted hostilely by 
his new neighbors who disapprove of a black family living in the neighborhood.205 Within two 
weeks of their move, Law’s home is broken into, and personal property taken.206 Law begins to 
hear rumors that his family is being targeted by the Ku Klux Klan, so he buys a shotgun.207 One 
week after the break-in, a sympathetic neighbor sees a flickering light in the window of Law’s 
darkened house and, suspecting another break-in, calls the police.208 When police arrive, they 
creep around the house, checking for signs of forced entry.209 Law wakes up and heads 
downstairs to investigate, gun in hand.210 Unable to see the police officers outside, Law believes 
that once again racist intruders are trying to find a way into his home.211 At this point, the 
police officers begin to inspect a door that was damaged in the previous break-in, and Law 
becomes convinced that he is witnessing another break-in.212 He sees one of the officer’s hands 
and notices that he is white.213 Law panics and shoots blindly through the door, killing one of 
the officers.214 He is charged and convicted of murder.215  
Law appeals, arguing that evidence of the previous attack on his home should be 
admitted in support of his belief that he was acting in self-defense.216 After all, the police 
appeared poised to enter Law’s home in the same way that the burglar had entered just a few 
weeks earlier, giving Law good reason to believe that it was the same perpetrator.217 The court 
explains that because Law honestly but unreasonably believed that he was in danger of injury 
and the killing was the only way to prevent it, he might be eligible for an imperfect self-
defense.218 His prior victimization suggests that Law was not nearly as morally blameworthy as 
someone who vindictively shoots a police officer at point blank range.219 The second degree 
murder charge is reversed, and Law is held liable for manslaughter and released on parole.220  
 Duress. The criminal law doctrine of duress also provides an opportunity for partial-
individualization in pursuit of more just outcomes. Consider, for example, the case of Lucila 
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Ventura, who immigrates to the U.S. from El Salvador at age twelve.221 Soon after she arrives, 
her father begins to rape her regularly, and threatens that he will kill her mother if she tells 
anyone.222 Ventura has an intellectual disability, she cannot speak English, and she has no 
friends.223 At age fifteen, she becomes pregnant with her father’s child.224 When she gives birth 
in the family’s apartment, her father cuts the umbilical cord, grabs the baby, and throws it out 
of a bathroom window and into an air shaft.225 After the incident, Ventura’s father begins to 
rape her more aggressively and painfully than before.226 At age seventeen, Ventura becomes 
pregnant again, and once again, she gives birth to a baby.227 Her father tells her to dispose of 
the baby, but Ventura is reluctant.228 After many threats, she acquiesces and throws her baby 
out of the window and into the air shaft.229 This time, though, the baby survives the fall. An 
hour later the police arrive.230 Ventura is charged with murder and attempted murder.231 
 At trial, Ventura is prevented from introducing in support of her duress defense 
evidence related to her father’s abuse, and is convicted.232 On appeal, the court grants Ventura 
the opportunity to introduce more individualizing evidence.233 There, an examination 
conducted by a state psychiatrist is introduced, revealing that Ventura suffers from post-
traumatic stress disorder and depression.234 “There are severe circumstances that influenced 
her mental state at the time and likely impaired her judgment, behavior, and decision-making 
ability,” the psychiatrist explains.235 A school psychologist from Ventura’s high school reports 
that Ventura has a tested IQ of 57 and functions academically at a first-grade level.236 Ventura’s 
probation officer also requests that the judge take into account the substantial influence that 
Ventura’s father had over her.237 Ventura’s recent immigration, language barriers, forced 
isolation, and difficulty assimilating made her feel as though she did not have access to medical, 
legal, or mental health services, her probation officer explains.238 The court ultimately reduces 
Ventura’s sentence to time served, given what the court describes as the “horrific 
circumstances” that led to her offense.239 A refusal to partially-individualize the objective 
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standard in judging whether she could reasonably have been expected to have resisted her 
father’s coercion would have resulted in a serious injustice.240 
 The Croy, Leidholm, Law, and Ventura cases make clear that where courts take a more 
holistic view of the circumstances under which the defendant's conduct occurred and the 
influences acting upon the defendant, they are better able to achieve a just outcome.  
 
C. Problematic Individualizations 
 
 While the objective standard should be partially individualized in many cases in order to 
obtain liability that is proportionate to an actor’s true blameworthiness, this is not to say that 
every individualizing factor presented by a defendant should be taken into account. For 
example, a standard in which racism, homophobia, sexism, or other hateful ideology is seriously 
considered as a mitigating factor is likely to inspire public distrust of the criminal justice system. 
In the below cases, troubling individualizing factors, such as cultural claims in support of 
conduct that would be seen as abhorrent in this country, are invoked by offenders in the 
context of self-defense, provocation, negligence, extreme emotional disturbance, and mistake 
as to justification.  
 The doctrine of provocation can provide examples of cases in which defendants seek to 
individualize the reasonable person standard based on idiosyncratic beliefs that the public 
might find reprehensible. Consider, for example, the case of Dong Lu Chen, a middle-aged man 
who immigrates to the U.S. from China with his wife.241 Shortly after arriving, Chen and his wife 
begin to experience difficulties in their marriage; Chen is working in Maryland, while his wife is 
living in New York, and the distance strains their relationship.242 When Chen returns to New 
York to visit, his wife refuses to have sex with him, and he becomes suspicious that she is having 
an affair.243 When Chen tries to have sex with his wife on one occasion, she refuses and tells 
him she prefers her other sexual partners over him.244 Chen becomes dizzy and enraged; in his 
native culture, a wife’s physical intimacy with other men signifies the downfall of her husband’s 
honor.245 Chen sincerely believes his wife’s infidelity will bring shame to his entire genealogical 
tree – past, present, and future.246 Failing to act in such circumstances is to ensure that he is 
permanently outcast.247 Chen grabs a claw hammer and strikes his wife eight times in the head, 
killing her.248 He then passes out.249 Chen is charged with second degree murder.250  
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In a bench trial, Chen’s lawyer argues that he acted involuntarily, moved as he was by 
strong cultural pressures.251 To bolster this claim, Chen’s lawyer produces an anthropology 
professor who explains Chen’s conduct as if Chen had no choice but to kill his wife.252 “In the 
Chinese context, adultery by a woman was considered a kind of stain upon the man, indicating 
that he had lost the most minimal standard of control over her,” the expert asserts.253 Chen is 
described as “a product of China,” and as being “controlled by the voice of the Chinese 
community.”254 After considering all of the evidence, the judge agrees with the defense, 
concluding that Chen’s culture “made him crack more easily” and thus, he could be guilty only 
of reckless homicide, rather than murder.255 Chen is sentenced to five years of probation for an 
offense that, had it been committed by someone else, might have carried a penalty of twenty 
years to life in prison.256 
 The doctrine of negligence also presents an opportunity for courts to consider 
individualizing factors that the public might find offensive or unconvincing. Consider, for 
example, the case of Robert Strong who was born in Saudi Arabia to a devoutly Sufi family.257 
Strong is a proponent of a particular Sufi practice called “suspended animation” which 
“intoxicates the consciousness” and brings the practitioner closer to God.258 At twenty-two, 
Strong moves to the U.S. where he declares himself to be the leader of the Sudan Muslim Sect, 
an unrecognized spin-off of Sufism invented by Strong that has no correlate elsewhere in the 
world.259 To grow his following, Strong frequently performs suspended animation ceremonies 
where he claims to stop a person’s heart and then stabs them with knives without causing 
injury.260 He does this by tightly tying a cord around a person’s arm, cutting off their circulation, 
and then stabbing them in the arm below the tied cord so that little to no blood is lost. He 
performs this ceremony safely dozens of times.261 One day, Strong tells his congregants that he 
will perform the suspended animation ceremony on a new initiate, and they gather to watch.262 
Using ropes and ties, Strong cuts off the circulation to his initiate’s arms and stabs him several 
times. When he removes the knives, the man rapidly bleeds to death.263 Strong is convicted of 
manslaughter and sentenced to fifteen years in prison.264  
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Strong appeals arguing that considering his religious beliefs, he should be liable at most 
for negligent homicide. Because Strong sincerely believed that the ceremony helped his 
followers attain a higher level of spiritual purity, he did not consciously disregard the risk of 
harm – as would be required of manslaughter – but rather, he was unaware of the risk 
altogether.265 His religious beliefs, he claims, made him sincerely believe that the ceremony was 
safe.266 Testimony is introduced from some of Strong’s followers that the victim himself 
consented to the ceremony and perceived no risk.267 In a 6-1 holding, the appeals court finds 
this testimony compelling and explains that Strong’s “claimed lack of perception, together with 
the belief of the victim and the defendant’s followers, if accepted by the jury, would justify a 
verdict of guilty of criminally negligent homicide.”268 Responding to the dissent’s argument that 
the holding overly individualizes the negligence standard to cater to Strong’s idiosyncrasies, the 
majority explains that “the court should look to other objective indications of a defendant’s 
state of mind to corroborate ... the defendant’s own subjective articulation.”269 The appeals 
court reverses and remands Strong’s earlier conviction, ruling that the jury should have been 
instructed to consider the lesser charge of criminally negligent homicide rather than 
manslaughter.270 In an effort to avoid another trial, Strong ultimately pleads guilty to attempted 
second-degree manslaughter and serves just nine days in prison.271  . 
 Consider the case of Ethan Couch, a teenager from a suburb of Fort Worth, Texas. Couch 
was raised by wealthy parents who frequently have run-ins with law enforcement but buy their 
way out of serious punishment.272 They pass onto their son the belief that criminal activity is 
not a big deal because it is always possible to pay the right people the right amount of money 
to escape serious sanction.273 Having internalized this value, Couch acts out frequently. He 
drops out of high school, uses drugs frequently, and lives alone in a large house paid for by his 
parents.274 One night, Couch has a party at which he and his friends drink alcohol excessively. 
Early in the morning, Couch decides to drive to a nearby convenience store and speeds, driving 
70 mph on a dark, rural road where the speed limit is 40 mph.275 Tragically, he strikes and kills 
four people who are standing on the side of the road fixing a flat tire on their car.276 Couch has 
a blood alcohol level of 0.24, three times the legal limit in Texas.277 He is charged with four 
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counts of intoxication manslaughter and two counts of intoxication assault, and the prosecution 
seeks the maximum sentence of twenty years.278 
 At trial, Couch’s lawyer introduces evidence of his wealth-saturated upbringing to 
demonstrate that it is difficult for Couch to understand the consequences of his actions.279 A 
psychologist for the defense claims that he suffers from “affluenza,” a psychological condition 
in which excessive privilege makes it difficult to judge the wrongfulness of conduct.280 
Apparently moved by the teen’s alleged condition, the judge gives Couch ten years of probation 
and orders him placed temporarily in a rehabilitation facility.281 Widespread public outcry 
follows the lenient sentence for the culpable killing of four people.282 “The details of the crime, 
and then the lack of justice in the sentence, outraged people in this area in a way that I haven’t 
ever seen people outraged,” a local sheriff reported.283 Couch later violates his probation by 
drinking alcohol and fleeing to Puerto Vallarta, Mexico.284  
 The doctrines of provoked “heat of passion” or the more modern “extreme emotional 
disturbance,” which mitigate an intentional killing to manslaughter, also provide an opportunity 
for courts to apply troubling individualizing characteristics to support an offender’s mitigation. 
Consider the case of Fumiko Kimura, a woman who immigrates to the U.S. from Japan when 
she is a teenager.285 Kimura meets her husband, who is also a Japanese immigrant and has two 
children. In keeping with the traditional family values on which she was raised, Kimura spends 
all of her time at home with her children.286 She has no close friends or hobbies, and she rarely 
leaves the house.287 At age thirty-three, she receives a disturbing phone call from a woman who 
tells Kimura that she has been having an affair with Kimura’s husband for three years.288 Kimura 
blames herself and believes that if she had been a better wife, her husband would not have 
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cheated on her.289 She becomes depressed, and barely sleeps or eats. She starts to consider the 
Japanese practice of Oyako-shinju or parent-child suicide.290 Although not a widespread 
practice, Oyako-shinju is regarded as an honorable, although tragic, way of ridding a family of 
shame caused by infidelity.291 Kimura takes her children to a deserted beach, carries them into 
the ocean, and attempts to drown them along with herself.292 She is spotted by two beachgoers 
who intervene.293 Kimura survives but her two children die.294 
 Kimura is charged with murder and felony child endangerment.295 The serious charges 
are met with outrage from many in the Japanese community, and the district attorney’s office 
receives petitions containing twenty-five-thousand signatures from people who urge a lenient 
sentence.296 The petition states that in Japan, Kimura would be charged with involuntary 
manslaughter at the most, “resulting in a light, suspended sentence, probation, and supervised 
rehabilitation.”297 Kimura’s lawyer argues that Kimura honestly believed that her children 
would be subjected to extraordinary humiliation throughout their lives if she failed to act.298 
Kimura’s behavior was “psychological in origin, but cultural in direction. Culture shaped or 
directed her actions,” her lawyer explains.299 As a result, Kimura is found to be entitled to the 
heat of passion mitigation from murder to voluntary manslaughter. The judge points to her 
established ties to her native Japanese heritage.300 Though Kimura forcibly drowned both of her 
children, she is sentenced to just a year in county jail, a verdict that many in the community 
– including many Japanese Americans – find far too lenient.301 
 One could conclude, then, that the state of current criminal law is unsatisfactory in 
relation to this fundamental issue of the standard to use in judging blameworthiness as it arises 
in adjudication doctrines. A wide variety of doctrines are affected – culpability requirements, 
statutory mitigations, and excuse defenses – yet there seems to exist no satisfactory guiding 
rules. The use of a purely objective standard invites regular injustice. Attempts to partially 
individualize the objective standard may avoid some injustices in some cases yet the law has no 
guiding rules by which such partial-individualization judgments can be made in a given case. 
And some individualizing factors, such as racism, homophobia, bad temperedness, or broad 
cultural differences, may be highly inappropriate to use but, with no guiding rules, commonly 
may be given deference. 
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III. Solving the Partial-Individualization Puzzle 
 
 While we can identify a series of cases in which individualization seems inappropriate,302 
and cases in which individualization seems appropriate, even necessary,303 what is needed is 
some mechanism to guide the individualization judgment in the full range of cases in which the 
issue can arise. Guidance in application requires addressing two distinct issues: first, when 
should evidence of individualizing factors be admissible at trial and, second, when such 
evidence is admitted, what guidance can be given to juries (or other decisionmakers) on when 
and how such evidence should be taken into account? 
 
A. Admitting Individualization Evidence at Trial 
 
 Two sorts of individualization evidence seem clearly inappropriate to be introduced at 
trial. First, unless the individualizing evidence concerns a factor that had a significant role in 
bringing about the actor’s offense conduct, it ought not be introduced to individualize jury 
judgments concerning culpability, mitigation, or excuse.304 To allow otherwise would be to 
open the trial to a host of factors that have little or no relevance that can improperly distract 
jurors from their legal duty. They ought not be encouraged to base their judgment on whether 
they like or dislike the defendant, for example, but rather to look only to matters relating to the 
defendant’s commission of the offense and the reasons for it.305 
 A second kind of evidence that ought to be excluded is that of individualizing factors 
that, if taken into account to benefit a defendant, would offend community norms by approving 
or at least accepting an attitude or point of view that the community believes ought to be 
actively discredited. Obvious examples include racial animus, homophobia, gender bias, and 
other such beliefs and attitudes that the community would find offensive as the basis for 
mitigation. Recall the several cases of this sort discussed in the subsection above concerning 
problematic individualizations.306 
 But aside from these two kinds of individualizing evidence, a commitment to the 
blameworthiness proportionality principle would call for a jury or other decisionmaker to 
understand as much as possible about the defendant’s capacities and situation. Thus, any 
individualization evidence not barred by one of these two exclusions – because it had no 
significant effect in bringing about the offense conduct or because it would offend community 
values if used as a basis for mitigation – ought to be admissible to more accurately assess the 
culpability, mitigation, or excuse issues raised by the facts of the case. 
 Rules governing the introduction of individualization evidence at trial will, of course, 
have effect in non-trial cases as well, for both prosecution and defense will include application 
of these rules in judging the strength of their case and, thereby, the plea agreement they might 
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be willing to accept. In other words, the individualization evidence admission rules will have 
effect in many if not most cases, especially because it is this kind of evidence that defense 
counsel are so commonly anxious to get before jurors.307 
 One can imagine a number of objections to the suggestion here that, with the two 
exceptions noted, individualization evidence ought to be more freely introduced at trial. One 
kind of objection might flow from a concern that allowing the introduction of more 
individualizing factors could significantly increase the length and complexity of trials, creating 
congestion and backlogs. That is, parsing through a defendant’s personal experiences and 
beliefs as well as the circumstances surrounding his crime may be a time-consuming effort.  
 It might be true that allowing greater individualization might make some trials longer, 
but this cannot be a major concern. Individualization is not an issue unless some existing legal 
doctrine raised by the facts of the case make an issue, a culpability requirement, a formal 
mitigation doctrine, or excuse defense. Further, even where such a legal issue exists in the case, 
it can hardly have a significant effect on a system in which so few cases go to trial.308 The main 
significant change in practice will be in the kind of facts that are seriously considered during 
plea discussions: some individualizing factors that defense counsel may have offered in the past 
but for which there was only a murky legal basis for relevance will now be legally relevant. On 
the other hand, once one clarifies the cases in which individualizing factors are relevant and 
how they are relevant – see the proposed provision below – the adjudication process will be 
clarified and simplified. Indeed, many murky claims of individualizing factors offered by defense 
counsel will, with codified guiding rules, now become more clearly irrelevant disposition of the 
case.   
A utilitarian theorist might argue that individualization evidence should only be used 
where it increases deterrence or otherwise improves the crime-control capacity of the criminal 
law. Such a theorist might worry that allowing greater individualizations into evidence, even 
during plea negotiations, would increase crime because offenders might believe that they could 
more easily escape punishment if they can invoke some sort of individualization factor to 
minimize their conduct. A more narrow use of individualization might be more appealing to 
these utilitarians because it might seem to make it harder for an actor to invade criminal 
liability, and therefore provide greater deterrent effect.  
This point is mistaken, however, for two reasons. First, the public typically would not be 
aware of such changes in the legal rules, particularly when rules are primarily procedural, as in 
the determination of which evidence may be admitted at trial. In that sense, the idea that 
people might commit more crimes because they learn that there is now a greater chance that 
their individual characteristics might be taken more seriously seems far-fetched. Second, while 
the public is typically unaware of the specific rules that make up the criminal law, they are 
highly aware of cases in which the criminal law appears to get it wrong and punishes someone 
noticeably more or less harshly than the public believes they deserve. As discussed above, 
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ample empirical research has demonstrated that the public has fairly clear, uniform ideas about 
the relative blameworthiness of defendants even when those defendants have complex 
backgrounds and the offense occurs in complex circumstances. When the public learns of a 
person being judged by the system as noticeably more or less blameworthy than would 
community views, the public’s trust in the criminal justice system marginally diminishes, which 
in turn marginally reduces the justice system’s crime-control effectiveness, as section I.B 
previously discussed.  
 
B. Guiding Jurors and Judges in the Use of Individualization Evidence 
 
 As the previous analyses of cases demonstrates, the individualization issue can arise in 
two different sorts of adjudication doctrines. First, the issue arises in cases of mistake where 
jurors are asked to judge whether an actor’s mistake was reasonable or negligent or reckless. 
This can arise whenever an offense definition requires proof of certain culpability elements or 
can arise in the context of general defenses such as mistake as to justification, most commonly 
in cases of mistake as to self-defense. In a second kind of case, the individualization issue can 
arise where an actor has failed to control himself and jurors are asked to decide whether some 
internal or external pressure or mental or emotional disturbance should provide a mitigation or 
excuse. This commonly occurs in cases of duress, provocation, extreme emotional disturbance, 
or involuntary intoxication. Thus, the analytic guidance provided to jurors ought to speak to 
each of these two kinds of cases: mistake cases and failure-to-control cases. Many of the 
individualization issues will be analogous in the two settings but the language one would use to 
provide guidance many differ. 
 In the mistake cases the ultimate question is whether we could have expected the actor 
to have avoided the mistake giving rise to liability. For example, in judging whether a statutory 
rape defendant satisfies the offense element of negligence – “he should [have been] aware of a 
substantial … risk that” his partner was underage309 – the jury should take into account the fact 
that the defendant had a low IQ and no social experience. In the failure-to-control cases, the 
ultimate question is different but analogous: could we have expected the actor, given his 
capacities and situation, to have resisted the influence of the factors pressing him toward 
commission of the offense. For example, in judging in a duress case whether “a person of 
reasonable firmness … would have been unable to resist,”310 the jury ought to take into account 
the fact that the actor was an inexperienced 17 years old.  
 Our analysis of the wide variety of individualizing factors that can be offered as relevant 
in an equally wide variety of cases suggests that the answer to the individualization puzzle is 
not to be found in identifying particular factors that should be taken into account in all cases 
and others that should not be taken into account in any cases. It appears that our shared 
intuitions of justice are too nuanced and complex for that. An individualizing factor might be 
important to take into account in some circumstances but the same factor ought not be taken 
into account in other circumstances. Further, an individualizing factor might be appropriate to 
take into account both of the two situations but ought to be given enormous effect in judging 
one case but given only marginal weight in judging another case.  
 In other words, the individualization puzzle does have an answer – individualization is 
not a mysterious unknowable mess, an unsolvable problem – but the answer to the 
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individualization question is simply complex. Does that mean that guidance to decision-makers 
is not possible? No. There is an enormous amount of useful guidance that can be provided but 
it is guidance that acknowledges the complexity of the question and therefore  does not 
attempt to give decision-makers a fixed answer but rather provides a decision process by which 
an answer can be reached for the case at hand.  
 What does such guidance look like? First, as discussed immediately above, we can 
exclude from admission at trial some factors altogether: first, factors that did not have an effect 
relevant to the legal issues of culpability, mitigation, or excuse and, second, factors that are 
barred for being in serious conflict with community norms. All other individualizing factors 
relevant to judging the actor’s blameworthiness under doctrines of culpability, mitigation, or 
excuse are admissible.  
 Of the individualizing factors that are admissible, the decision-maker was asked to focus 
on number of specific inquiries. First, what is the strength of an individualizing factor’s influence 
in bringing about the actor’s offense conduct or mistake. For example, what was the 
seriousness of the threat, the severity of their fear, the power of cultural influence, etc. The 
stronger the force of the factors influence, the less blameworthy the offender may be. 
 A second and distinct inquiry is the actor’s capacity to resist the factor’s influence in 
bringing about the offense conduct or the mistake. This is not the ultimate normative judgment 
about whether we could have expected the actor to have resisted the influence or avoided the 
mistake, but rather the more factual assessment of the extent of the actor’s limited capacity to 
resist or avoid. Important here will be such things as an actor’s limited mental capacity, their 
youthfulness, their social isolation, their mental or emotional state distorting reasoning, as in 
instances of PTSD or Stockholm syndrome, their limited communication skills, etc. Any of these 
factors may make it more difficult for an actor to resist the individualizing factor’s influence in 
bringing about the conduct or the mistake. By taking into account both of these kinds of facts – 
the strength of the factor’s influence pushing toward the offense and the extent of an actor’s 
capacity to resist such influence – the jury can form some sense of what could have been 
expected of this actor in this situation.  
 A third key inquiry is the seriousness of the offense. The more serious the offense, the 
greater our expectation that the actor should resist the influence of the individualizing factor 
and avoid the offense. The less serious the offense, the more we may be willing to understand 
how the strength of the influencing factor and the limited capacity of the actor to resist it could 
end up bringing about the offense conduct or the mistake. 
 These three factors, which call jurors’ special attention, focus strictly on the situation as 
it exists at the time of the offense. However, other important inquiries call for consideration of 
the events occurring before the offense. Was the actor at fault in bringing about the 
individualizing factor or its influence that the actor now asks the jury to take account of? It may 
be relevant, for example, that the actor voluntarily joined a cult knowing their indoctrination 
plans might lead him to commit the offense.  
 If not at fault in bringing about the individualizing factor or its influence, was the actor 
perhaps at fault for failing to take an opportunity to avoid or escape the factor or its influence? 
For example, while the actor was born into an existing cult, thus faultless for his initial 
membership, had he reached an age and had sufficient opportunity in life experience that we 
might have expected him to have left the cult or rejected its indoctrination? 
 Finally, jurors ought to take into account the extent to which allowing the factor to 
mitigate the offender’s liability might conflict with existing community norms and values by 
seeming to approve or at least accept a belief or set of values that the community seeks to 
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condemn. In other words, while particularly egregious cases of abhorrent beliefs or values 
might be barred by the judge from admission at trial, even where that high standard is not met 
and the individualization evidence is admitted, jurors ought to include in their deliberations the 
same possibility that having the abhorrent beliefs or values contribute to a mitigation would be 
too costly in undermining existing norms and values and in undermining the criminal justice 
system’s moral credibility with the community. 
 To summarize, the individualization puzzle has eluded scholars for so long in large part 
because, it turns out, other than the two exclusions from consideration – factors that did not 
have a substantial effect in bringing about the offense and factors the consideration of which 
would sufficiently appall the community as to undermine the criminal law’s moral credibility – 
there do not exist specific factors that should be taken into account and specific factors that 
should not. The same individualizing factor might be appropriate to take into account in one 
case but not in another. Nearly any (non-excluded) individualizing factor might theoretically be 
appropriate to take into account, but each must be weighed according to certain specific 
aspects of the case: the strength of the factor’s influence in bringing about the offense, the 
capacity of the actor to resist the factor’s influence, the seriousness of the offense, the actor’s 
fault in having the factor, and any conflict with existing community norms and values that might 
flow from allowing the factor to mitigate or excuse. 
 One may be concerned that this approach opens too widely the possible individualizing 
factors that may be taken into account. The two bases for complete exclusion – insufficient 
effect and appalling to the community – will do some screening, but this still leaves an 
enormous array of factors that might be taken into account, making trials more burdensome 
and less predictable, as noted previously. However, we think this concern is overblown. 
 First, and foremost, a true commitment to doing justice requires that we consider all 
individualizing factors that can affect our judgment of the offender’s degree of 
blameworthiness. To exclude a relevant individualizing factor is to sacrifice justice for 
expediency.  
Second, the system proposed here, and detailed in the proposed statutory formulation 
below, is not one in which defense counsel are free to run wild with any individualizing factor 
they can construct, using it to play upon juror sympathies that have no relevance to the extent 
of the offender’s blameworthiness for the offense at hand. For example, claims that the 
defendant has admirably gotten rid of his drug habit and successfully started a small business 
with several employees might well give grounds for admiring this aspect of the defendant’s life 
choices but would be irrelevant to assessing his blameworthiness for statutory rape and, 
therefore, would be inadmissible even under the broader use of individualizing factors 
proposed here. 
Further, the potential for defense counsel abuse of the proposal’s more liberal 
introduction of individualizing factors is offset by the specific guidance given jurors about how 
and when they are to take individualizing factors into account, guidance that is missing from 
today’s practice that either unjustly excludes relevant individualizing factors or allows broad 
judicial discretion to admit individualizing factors without guidance to the jury. With the 
guidelines as to the relevant factors that ought to be taken into account, an offender’s claim of 
past the drug rehabilitation and small business success would more clearly be seen as not 
relevant. 
 Nor can the proposal be criticized as asking too much of jurors because it calls for a 
sometimes complex and intuitive justice judgment rather than application of a mechanistic rule. 
Current criminal law regularly calls upon jurors to make such justice judgments, as is evident in 
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the many doctrines of culpability, mitigation, and excuse discussed in the cases in Part II. In the 
insanity defense and the involuntary intoxication defense, for example, jurors must decide 
whether the offender lacks “substantial capacity” to appreciate the criminality of their conduct 
or to conform their conduct to the requirements of law.311 In a duress excuse, jurors must 
determine whether the coercive threat is one that “a person of reasonable firmness” would 
have given into.312 In the mitigation of murder to manslaughter, jurors must determine whether 
the killing was committed under the influence of “extreme mental or emotional disturbance for 
which there is a reasonable explanation or excuse.”313 When recklessness is required as to an 
objective element of an offense, as is the common default position,314 jurors must determine 
whether “disregard [of the risk] involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a 
law-abiding person would observe in the actor situation.”315 In other words, what we ask jurors 
to do here is not substantially different from what we commonly ask them to do in many 
doctrines of culpability, mitigation, and excuse. 
 Finally, the proposal might be challenged for its apparent devaluation of the sentencing 
process. After all, judges already make quasi-individualizing decisions when they reduce an 
offender’s sentence for a variety of factors such as remorse or a particularly traumatic 
childhood. Why invite the untrained intuitions of lay persons into the mix when skilled judges 
may already be equipped to take up the individualization challenge?  
 First, to leave the individualization issue to be dealt with during sentencing process is to 
exclude it from the determination of criminal liability, where it frequently will have the effect of 
providing a complete defense to the offense charged or reducing the grade of an offense. 
Failing to make appropriate individualizing adjustments in determining the offense of 
conviction cannot be fully compensated for through the sentencing process. 
 Further, the proposal seeks to protect and promote jury involvement as desirable and 
indeed necessary. Jurors have been shown to be the most reliable representation of community 
views on such justice-focused issues as individualization.316 Perhaps more importantly, it is 
reliance upon the lay intuitions of justice of a jury, rather than the personal preferences of a 
single sentencing judge, that will maximize the criminal law’s moral credibility with the 
community. Reliance upon individual judicial sentencing discretion pushes such community 
justice judgments out of the frame and invites dispositions that conflict with shared community 
judgments of justice.  
 Finally, reliance upon judicial sentencing discretion is likely to produce unjustified 
disparity among sentencing judges, as each judge may have his or her own personal views 
about proper individualization. The last several decades of disparity studies and the resulting 
sentencing guideline movement support this point.317  
 
311 MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 306 at § 2.08(4). 
312 Id. at § 2.09(1). 
313 Id. at § 2.10(3). 
314 Id. at § 2.02(3). 
315 Id. at § 2.02(2)(c). 
316 Paul H. Robinson & Barbara Spellman, Sentencing Decisions: Matching the Decisionmaker to the Decision Nature 
105 COLUM. L. REV. 1124, 1138-1140 (2005). 
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United States v. Meza, 127 F. 3d 545 (7th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1103 (1998) 107 Y. L. J. 2345, 2352-55 
(1998); Sonja B. Starr & M. Marit Rehavi, Mandatory Sentencing and Racial Disparity: Assessing the Role of 
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 If a jurisdiction insists on barring juries from the individualization decision, then they 
ought at very least provide judges with the system of individualization guidance provided here. 
Rather than leaving it to a spontaneous fit of compassion from the bench, the formulation 
provides judges with a decision tree that to guide the individualization decision and, most 
importantly, that same decision tree will be the guidance for all other judges in the jurisdiction. 
But even with such individualization guidance provided to judges, jury involvement is to be 
preferred over strict judicial determinations, for the reasons noted above. 
  
C. A Proposed Statutory Individualization Provision 
 
 Perhaps the real test of whether the approach proposed here is practical is whether it 
can be codified into a workable statutory formulation. The guidance in taking account of 
individualizing factors described above might be codified in something like the following: 
 
XXX. Individualizing Justice Judgments Called for by Culpability, Mitigation, or Excuse 
Doctrines 
 
 (1) Admitting Individualizing Evidence at Trial. In order to determine whether an actor 
has a required offense culpability element or qualifies for a mitigation or excuse, the court 
shall not admit into evidence at trial a factor or group of factors that: 
 (a) did not have a significant effect in bringing about the actor’s offense conduct, 
or 
 (b) the use of which to reduce liability would be seen by the community as so 
abhorrent as to undermine the criminal law’s moral credibility.  
 (c) A factor that is not disqualified under subsections (a) or (b) may be taken into 
account by the decisionmaker if it is relevant to whether the actor satisfies an offense 
culpability element or qualifies for a mitigation or excuse. 
 (2) Taking Account of an Individualizing Factor. When taking account of an 
individualizing factor, the decisionmaker shall consider: 
 (a) in cases of control failure, the extent to which this actor could have been 
expected to have resisted the influence of the factor in bringing about the offense 
conduct, which includes taking special account of:  
 (i) the seriousness of the offense; 
 (ii) the strength of the factor’s influence in bringing about the actor’s 
offense conduct; and 
 (iii) the capacity of this actor to resist the factor’s influence; 
(b) in cases of mistake, the extent to which the actor could have been expected 
to have avoided the mistake giving rise to liability, which includes taking special account 
of: 
 (i) the seriousness of the offense; 
 (ii) the sincerity of the actor’s mistaken belief as to the existing 
circumstances; and 
 
Perspectives on Disparity in Guideline Research 4. FED. SENTENCING REP. 123, 123-125 (1991); Sarah Krasnostein & 
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How Do You Know When You’ve Got There? 76 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 265, 267 (2013); Margareth Etienne, Parity, 
Disparity, and Adversariality: First Principles of Sentencing 58 STAN. L. REV. 309, 311-15 (2005); D.A. THOMAS, 
CONSTRAINTS ON JUDGMENT: THE SEARCH FOR STRUCTURED DISCRETION IN SENTENCING, 1860-1910 68 (1979). 
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 (iii) the sincerity of the actor’s belief that their conduct was not wrongful; 
 (c) the extent to which the actor was at fault: 
 (i) in bringing about the factor or its influence, or  
 (ii) in failing to take an opportunity to avoid or escape the factor or its 
influence; and 
 (d) whether use of the factor in this instance to mitigate liability would 
communicate approval or acceptance of a perspective or belief that would offend the 
norms and values of the community within the jurisdiction. 
 
 Note that it is not this statute on partial individualization that will itself determine 
whether an actor is excused or gains a mitigation. The only function of this provision is to 
identify what partially-individualizing factors ought to be taken into account and what weight 
they should be given when applying the terms of a culpability, mitigation, or excuse doctrine. It 
is those provisions that provide the specific standards that the decision-maker is to apply, for 
example, in assessing the actor’s culpable state of mind at the time of the offense or in 
assessing whether the actor showed enough firmness in resisting duress. 
 
D. The Proposed Provision in Operation 
 
 To provide some detail on how the proposed formulation would work, we provide 
below a short commentary on each subsection. 
 Section (1). Admitting Individualizing Evidence at Trial. Section (1) takes up the 
preliminary issue of whether evidence of an individualizing factor should be admitted at trial. 
Two grounds of exclusion are provided. In subsection (a), individualizing factors are excluded if 
they had no significant effect on the offender’s commission of the offense, as in the case of the 
interference with prison operations where the successful trash business is offered as an 
individualizing factor that ought to be taken into account. Or consider the case of an offender 
charged with extortion who can point to a mental disorder short of an insanity defense. The 
factor may have some relevance in some context but may be insufficiently related to the 
offense at hand to justify admission at trial. 
 A second basis for exclusion, in subsection (b), is an individualizing factor, such as racial 
animus, that the community would find abhorrent to allow to mitigate liability and punishment, 
so much so that such use would undermine the criminal law’s moral credibility. Other such 
factors might include anti-Semitism, misogyny, or homophobia where, if mitigation were 
offered on the basis of one of these beliefs, the criminal justice system would seem to condone 
or at least accept such discrimination and hate. 
 Subsection (c) makes explicit what is implicit from the two previous subsections: any 
factor not disqualified under subsection (a) or (b) can in fact be admitted at trial "if it is relevant 
to whether the actor satisfies an offense culpability element or qualifies for a mitigation or 
excuse.” Of course, even if not excluded by Section (1), there are many other reasons why a 
particular piece of evidence might be excluded at trial, depending on the rules of evidence at 
play in the particular jurisdiction. 
 Section (2). Taking Account of an Individualizing Factor. When an individualizing factor 
is admissible at trial, Section (2) provides the specific guidance to decision-makers about how 
an individualizing factor should be treated, by providing a range of questions to ask, the 
answers to which may suggest that the individualizing factor be given more weight or less 
weight or no weight. 
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 Subsection (2)(a) provides such guidance in relation to cases involving failure of control, 
as commonly arises in cases of provocation, extreme emotional disturbance, duress, and 
involuntary intoxication. Subsection (2)(b) provides such guidance for cases where the 
individualizing factor is offered as relevant to why an offender made a mistake, commonly 
arising in cases relating to recklessness, negligence, and mistake as to justification. There are 
conceptual parallels between the critical inquiries in the loss of control cases and in the mistake 
cases but the language used in the two contexts are necessarily different. 
Subsection (2)(a). Control Failure Cases. Control failure cases are those in which an 
external or internal pressure is imposed on, or arises in, an offender so forcefully that she 
struggles to exercise self-restraint, or feels compelled or coerced to act. Such cases might arise 
in the doctrine of duress, provocation, extreme emotional disturbance, involuntary intoxication, 
or certain paraphilias, where an individualizing factor may play a role in either bringing about 
the circumstances that led to the offense or in diminishing the defendant’s ability to resist the 
offense or increasing her susceptibility to other criminogenic factors. In such cases, the 
proposed individualization provision asks the decision-maker to consider whether the offender 
could have been expected to have resisted the influence of the factor. Here, the word 
“expected” is crucial, suggesting that the inquiry is a normative one in which the trier of fact is 
meant to ask what conduct was rightfully due from the actor in the circumstances. The answer 
to this normative question is the product of three areas of inquiry: the seriousness of the 
offense, the strength of the factor’s influence, and the capacity of the actor to resist the factor’s 
influence.  
Subsection (2)(a)(i). Seriousness of the Offense. The first inquiry considers both the harm 
caused in physical or pecuniary damage and the moral wrongness of the offense. It also takes 
into account any relevant factors regarding the victims of the offense, including their 
relationship to the defendant and their particular vulnerabilities, such as age or disability. The 
more serious the offense, the more the offender could have been expected to resist the 
influence of the factor.318 It is worth noting that this analysis rejects a deterministic picture of 
criminal conduct but rather assumes that offenders are mostly capable of choosing their 
conduct. One can imagine the actor being pushed and pulled by various countervailing forces, 
but it is assumed such forces rarely fully override her decision-making capacity.  
Consider, for example, the case of Donna Marie Ely, a young woman with a mild 
intellectual disability, who is repeatedly physically and verbally abused by her boyfriend.319 Ely 
and her boyfriend live with their four young children but they rarely leave the house.320 Ely 
hates her boyfriend’s abuses but she depends on him and is overwhelmed by the prospect of 
leaving him.321 Over time, Ely’s boyfriend starts sexually abusing the couple’s children.322 Ely is 
aware of the abuse and wants to protect her children but is afraid.323 Eventually, her boyfriend 
asks Ely to partake in the abuse. Ely feels that she cannot refuse, so she sexually assaults her 
children and helps her boyfriend to rape their daughter.324 The abuse continues for nearly a 
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year. Ultimately, Ely is charged with involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, incest, and a litany 
of other child-welfare related offenses.325   
On the one hand, Ely might be able to argue that she acted under duress and that her 
judgment was clouded by the symptoms of battered spouse syndrome. On the other hand, the 
offense is so terribly serious that one could conclude that she should have done more to resist 
it. While we might understand if she retaliated physically against her boyfriend, given all his 
abuse, but it seems unfathomable that she should assault her children, especially for such a 
long period of time and in such a morally condemnable manner. This was not a spanking or a 
slap on the wrist, but an extraordinary violation of bodily autonomy with potentially far-
reaching physical and psychological consequences. Balancing the weight of a significant, but 
non-imminent, physical threat with an offense so serious that it would likely violate any 
mother’s basic instincts could well yield the conclusion that the woman could have been 
expected to have resisted her boyfriend’s influence and therefore should not be eligible for a 
significant mitigation. Ultimately, while a decision-maker ought to take the individualizing 
circumstances into account, the seriousness of the offense may lead them to give the factors 
much less weight than they might otherwise. 
Subsection (2)(a)(ii). Strength of the Factor’s Influence. The second inquiry in the ambit 
of control-failure cases concerns the causal force of the factor in bringing about the actor’s 
offending conduct. Once again, the picture of causation is not deterministic or absolute. Rather, 
the factor is one of many influences playing out in an offender’s life and affecting his 
deliberations over the course of action to pursue. Circumstances that affect the strength of the 
factor’s influence might include the frequency with which the actor is exposed to, or acted 
upon by, the individualizing factor, as in the case of a battered spouse who is repeatedly 
physically assaulted by her husband. The overall effect of the factor in its impact on the 
personal identity of the actor can also be relevant, as where a homophobic slur is directed at a 
gay person or a racial epithet at a Black person. Finally, an assessment of the strength of the 
factor’s influence may involve pathological considerations as where the factor is some sort of 
addiction or involves a paraphilia. The stronger the factor’s influence in bringing about the 
offense conduct, the less the actor could have been expected to have resisted its influence. 
Consider, for example, the Gounagias case discussed previously.326 Recall that the 
offender is a young man, recently immigrated from Greece, who is sodomized by his roommate 
while unconscious and subsequently mocked and derided by his co-workers, friends, and 
neighbors, who are his only connections in the U.S.327 After a particularly humiliating round of 
taunts at the local coffee shop, Gounagias returns to his dormitory and shoots his victimizer 
while the man sleeps.328 He is denied a provocation mitigation and is charged and convicted of 
first-degree murder.329  
Here, Gounagias’s individualizing factors are the sexual assault and repeated humiliation 
that he suffers, both of which are enormously powerful in their effect. Over the course of three 
weeks, Gounagias is constantly reminded and taunted about what was arguably the worst 
event in his life. The series of small, painful provocations occurs constantly, unavoidably, and 
and without respite, increasingly haunt Gounagias at his place of work, at his home, and at the 
local eateries he frequents. As a socially isolated, recent immigrant, the strength of these 
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factors are all the more intense as life in this community is all he knows and all he can imagine 
for himself in the U.S. The creatures the strength of the factors, the more we can 
understandable why Gounagias failed to resist their influence. 
Subsection (2)(a)(iii). Capacity of the Actor to Resist the Factor’s Influence. The final 
inquiry in control-failure cases concerns the capacity of the actor to resist the factor’s influence. 
This assessment is may be the most difficult because it requires the trier of fact to make a folk 
psychological judgment about the actor’s individual competencies – particularly her ability to 
exercise self-control or to withstand external pressures – without necessarily fully 
understanding the scope of the actor’s lived experiences and faculties. Criminal law cases are 
each a snapshot of a person’s life, and the trier of fact will always have to make judgments 
about the actor in light of information deficits. That being said, decisionmakers are capable of 
developing notions of an offender’s capacities based on factors such as her prior conduct, her 
age, her intellectual development, her relative social isolation, handicaps she might suffer, and 
a host of other factors relevant to her ability to withstand the pressure toward the offense 
conduct. There are also cases where the influencing factor is so integral to the individual’s 
identity or sense of self that we can easily understand her limitations in resisting it, as might be 
the case for a Holocaust survivor confronted with a barrage of anti-Semitic insults. The less the 
actor is capable of resisting the factor’s influence, the less she could have been expected to 
have resisted committing the offense toward which it pressed.  
Consider, for example, the case of Barry Kingston, a man who has occasional pedophilic 
desires but who has never acted on them because he believes they are morally wrong.330 Due 
to an unrelated dispute at work, Kingston’s employer seeks to blackmail him and contracts with 
a well-known local criminal who, after some digging, learns of Kingston’s sexual preferences.331 
The criminal invites a teenage boy to his house, drugs him, undresses him, and poses his 
unconscious body suggestively on a bed.332 The criminal then invites Kingston over and drugs 
him as well, but with less of a dose.333 Feeling groggy, Kingston asks the criminal if he has put 
something in his drink.334 Instead of answering, the criminal leads Kingston to the naked boy 
and tells Kingston that he should have sex with the boy.335 After hesitating, Kingston, in his 
confused and drugged state, sexually assaults the boy, while the criminal secretly films him.336 
Kingston is charged with indecent assault on a minor, but he has no recollection of the 
evening.337 
In assessing Kingston’s capacity to resist the offense, the involuntary intoxication is 
highly relevant. Certainly, Kingston had the capacity to resist his pedophilic urges, and in fact, 
did so repeatedly over the course of his life. But effect of the drugging and reducing his ability 
to resist, especially given the added nudges of the criminal leading him to the teenage boy and 
encouraging him to assault him, seem highly significant in assessing Kingston’s 
blameworthiness. The court concludes that, “A drunken intent is still an intent,” and Kingston is 
convicted.338 But one might conclude that, while the pedophilia tendencies admittedly were his 
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own, his lack of capacity to resist them, through no fault of his own, ought to be given 
significant weight in judging whether to eliminate or reduce his criminal liability. 
Subsection (2)(b). Mistake Cases. Mistake cases focus on the actor’s capacity to have 
avoided the mistake that gave rise to the offense. In mistake cases, unlike control-failure cases, 
the mistake does not cause the conduct per se but rather brings about the circumstances in 
which the actor feels free to engage in the offense conduct. Such mistake may arise, for 
example, where the actor misjudged the seriousness, imminence, or existence of a perceived 
threat against her; makes an error about whether her conduct was criminally prohibited; 
mistakenly believed that she was justified in her conduct. The less the actor could have been 
expected to have avoided the mistake, the more she is deserving of some sort of reduction in 
liability. 
The proposed formulation asks the decision-maker in mistake cases to take special 
account of three factors: the seriousness of the offense, the sincerity of the actor’s mistaken 
belief in the existing circumstances, and the sincerity of the actor’s mistaken belief that her 
conduct was not wrongful. This list of factors is not intended to be fully comprehensive. 
Certainly, other factors might arise in mistake cases that shed light on the offender’s 
blameworthiness. However, as a practical matter, these three factors seem to commonly play a 
large role in such cases. 
Subsection (2)(b)(i). Seriousness of the Offense. As with the control-failure cases, the first 
inquiry concerns the seriousness of the offense. The more serious the offense, the more one 
would have expected the actor to have avoided making the mistake leading to the offense. In 
general, people are expected to ensure that they are acting on correct information and beliefs 
when they exercise lethal force or put another’s at risk of physical harm, for example. We 
expect a hunter to be certain that his target is a deer and not a hiker when he pulls the trigger. 
This expectation is less strong in cases where the offense is purely pecuniary or where another 
person’s life does not hang in the balance. 
Consider, for example, the case of Dale and Leilani Neumann, a deeply religious couple 
who live in a rural, isolated Pentecostalist community.339 Over the course of three months, they 
observe their eleven-year-old daughter’s health deteriorate.340 She grows increasingly lethargic 
and pale, and has difficulty eating and breathing.341 The couple love their daughter dearly and 
apply every form of spiritual remedy they can think of, but they do not take her to a doctor as 
they believe that only God can heal.342 One morning, they find their daughter unconscious and 
having difficulty breathing.343 The couple invite over their prayer group and Church elders, but 
those persons’ efforts do not seem to work.344 At last, a Church elder calls an ambulance, but 
when paramedics arrive the girl is pronounced dead.345 The cause of her death is diabetic 
ketoacidosis, an easily preventable illness.346 The Neumann’s are charged and convicted of 
reckless homicide.347 
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Here, the Neumanns have made a clear mistake with respect to the care of their child, 
resulting in the most grave outcome imaginable. Their religious faith tended to blind them to 
the risk. While the parents may argue that they honestly believed that a doctor could not do 
anything for their daughter’s health that God could not do, this mistaken belief effectively 
denied their child the medical care needed to save her. With their daughter’s condition rapidly 
declining, and the intensive prayer sessions having no real effect, the Neumanns should have 
recognized the seriousness of the situation and thought more critically about their actions. They 
knew that the stakes were high – their daughter’s health was rapidly declining – and calling an 
ambulance at the eleventh hour was a highly uncertain backstop. While it may be appropriate 
to take into account the individualizing factor of their religious beliefs, the more seriousness the 
potential consequences, the more we can expect a parent to reevaluate the need to consider 
alternative possibilities. 
Subsection (2)(b)(ii). Sincerity of Mistaken Belief About Existing Circumstances. The 
second inquiry in mistake cases focuses on the sincerity of the offender’s belief in the existing 
circumstances. This inquiry focuses strictly on the actor’s perception of the material facts and 
the sincerity of her belief in them. For example, did the defendant honestly believe that the 
package she drove across state lines contained laundry detergent and not heroin? Did the 
defendant honestly believe that he was shooting a wild dog that had crept onto his property, 
and not a neighbor he had been quarreling with? The primary questions raised by this inquiry 
are first, whether the actor’s belief was deeply and sincerely held, and second, whether or not 
the actor’s mistaken belief is understandable given all that is known about the actor and the 
situation in which she found herself. The more deeply held an actor’s mistaken belief and the 
more understandable the mistake given the actor’s situation, the less she can be expected to 
have avoided it, and the more her individualizing circumstances are appropriately used to 
reduce liability. 
Recall the Law case discussed previously,348 in which a Black man who moves into a 
predominantly White suburb in Maryland in the 1970s is burglarized and threatened by his 
racist neighbors.349 When, a few nights after the incident, Law hears what he believes to be 
someone trying to unlock his back door, he immediately believes it is another racially motivated 
break-in.350 In fact, the man fiddling with the back door is a police officer responding to a call 
from a sympathetic neighbor who believes someone is breaking into Law’s house again.351 
Unable to see the officer’s uniform, Law shoots through the door, killing the officer. Law is 
charged with first-degree murder.352 
Here, Law’s mistake with respect to the existing circumstances seems both 
understandable and honestly held. He had just been victimized by a nearly identical attack; he 
sincerely believed that his racist neighbors were conspiring against him and would return to 
harass him; and, as a Black man living in a highly segregated area during racially fraught times, 
he had reason to think that a subsequent attack might threaten his life or the life of one of his 
family members. Thus, while Law’s mistake was tragically quite costly, leading to the death of 
an innocent person, it is understandable that he could have made such a mistake in the 
circumstance and honestly so. A decision-maker could conclude, then, that the individualizing 
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factors of the situation are entirely appropriate to take into account as the basis for a 
mitigation or excuse. 
Subsection (2)(b)(iii). Mistaken Belief That Conduct Not Wrongful. The final inquiry for 
mistake cases examines the actor’s mistaken belief that her conduct was not wrongful. Criminal 
liability depends on the assumption that criminal violations entail some sort of consciousness of 
wrongdoing. In that sense, in cases where the actor honestly but mistakenly believes that her 
conduct is not wrongful, she may be entitled to have an individualizing factor taken into 
account if her mistake was sincere and understandable, as with the mistake of fact inquiry 
discussed in the subsection above. The inquiry here is somewhat more complicated, however. It 
requires an assessment of more than just what perceived facts are believable, an inquiry that is 
well within the life experience of most jurors. Here, the issue calls for the more complex 
judgment about our expectation that people will know the moral status of their conduct. This 
means, for example, that jurors must evaluate the sincerity and understandability of beliefs 
derived from religious teachings, cult indoctrination, and cultural influences, none of which 
they themselves have experienced. And such cases might include a wide range of serious 
offenses, such as honor killings, female genital mutilation, rape-based bride selection, or 
parent-child suicides. In each instance, jurors are asked to try to put themselves in the 
defendant’s situation and to try to faithfully judge the strength and understandability of the 
belief given that situation. 
Consider, for example, the Kimura case, discussed previously.353 Recall that a Japanese 
mother who immigrated to the U.S. more than twenty years ago learns that her husband has 
been having an affair with another woman for several years.354 Distraught, she feels that the 
only way to rid herself of the shame is to commit parent-child suicide, a practice that is 
tolerated in parts of Japan.355 She tries to drown herself and her children in the ocean, but two 
beach-goers intervene. Kimura lives, but her two children die. She is charged with first-degree 
murder.356  
Kimura might argue that her mistaken belief that her conduct was not wrong should be 
taken into account because parent-child suicide was accepted as a legitimate practice in her 
native culture. However, while it may be appropriate to consider the individualizing factor, the 
proposed formulation might lead the decision-maker to be somewhat skeptical about how 
much weight it should be given. Having been in the U.S. for twenty years, could a jury have 
some question about whether Kimura genuinely and understandably saw the killing of her 
children as not wrongful?  
Subsection (2)(c). Extent to Which the Actor Was at Fault for Having or Retaining the 
Individualizing Factor. Subsection (2)(c) applies to both the failure-to-control cases of 
subsection (2)(a) and the mistake cases of subsection (2)(b). It moves beyond the situation that 
existed at the time of the offense and has the decision-maker consider the offender’s 
experiences before the offense. Was the actor at fault in creating the conditions that led to his 
criminal conduct? The presumption of this subsection is that an individualizing factor should 
not be taken into account when the actor has knowingly brought it upon himself or willfully 
retained it when he could have escaped it’s influence.  
 
353 See Part II.C. supra. 





Subsection (2)(c)(i). Bringing About the Factor. The first inquiry considers whether the 
offender was at fault in bringing about the factor or its influence. Of special interest here will be 
those cases in which the offender is responsible for their individualizing factor – that is, the 
existence or the coerciveness of the factor was of their own creation. Such cases would include 
instances where the offender was not born or raised with the individualizing factor, but rather 
came to the factor of his own volition as where an uncoerced adult joins a destructive cult or 
gang, or where a person abuses drugs that make him more prone to violence.  
Consider, for example, the case of Harvey Kobayashi, a Japanese-American, Buddhist in 
his forties who is raised to always be selfless and put others’ needs before his own.357 He 
sincerely believes that there is no greater shame than not being able to satisfy others’ needs.358 
Kobayashi struggles socially, but using a phone-based dating service, he is able to meet a 
woman that he comes to trust and think of as his girlfriend.359 Unbeknownst to Kobayashi, 
though, the woman is a scam artist.360 She starts to ask Kobayashi for money, and he obliges. 
Over time, the woman’s schemes escalate, and unable to say no, Kobayashi spends upwards of 
$250,000 on her.361 Kobayashi files for bankruptcy and moves back in with his parents.362 One 
day, the woman asks Kobayashi to come to her apartment, where she demands that he buy her 
a house.363 She yells and swears at Kobayashi, threatening to kill his mother if he does not buy 
the house for her. Suddenly, feeling like he has no other way out of the situation, Kobayashi 
grabs a knife and stabs the woman, killing her.364 He is charged with first degree murder.365 
While Kobayashi endured an extraordinary amount of harassment and strife leading up 
to his offense, to a large extent he brought these difficulties upon himself. His refusal to say no, 
despite every indication that the woman was not really his friend, laid the foundation for his 
subsequent criminal conduct. Allowing himself to be so severely taken advantage to lead him 
into bankruptcy, created the circumstances in which he reacted violently to a provocation that 
he might otherwise have shrug off. Thus, while his special circumstances leading to the offense 
might be taken into account, the decision-maker could well properly decide to give them less 
weight because of his own role in bringing them about.  
Subsection (2)(c)(ii). Failing to Avoid or Escape. The second inquiry of this subsection 
concerns cases in which the offender had an opportunity to escape the individualizing factor or 
its influence but failed to take such opportunity. This inquiry does not demand heroics on the 
part of the offender. A teenage offender whose crime is related to her upbringing in an 
impoverished, violent neighborhood would not be expected to have avoided her conduct if it 
could be shown that some opportunity to leave the neighborhood arose when she was a child. 
At that point in her life, it may not have been realistic to think that she understood the 
implications of passing up the opportunity. But instances where an offender had concrete 
avenues to avoid the individualizing factor’s influence, a failure to do so appropriately reduces 
the weight that such factor should be given as the basis for mitigation. If an individual who 
knows he has serious pedophilia takes a wrong turn and finds himself in front of an elementary 
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school, the presumption is that he should immediately leave and take the necessary 
precautions to avoid committing an offense. The greater the missed opportunity to escape or 
avoid the factor and its influence, the less weight a decision-maker may make in taking account 
of the factor.  
Consider, for example, the case of Gabriel Heinemann, a teenage boy who, while visiting 
family out of state, meets a teenage girl who he is attracted to.366 The girl invites him to hang 
out with her and her friends at her friend’s house, but when they arrive, two older boys are 
there, carrying guns and wearing bulletproof vests.367 Heinemann is afraid but wants to appear 
relaxed and comfortable in front of the girl he likes, so he does not voice his concerns.368 Later 
that night, the older boys ask Heinemann to drive the group to a drug dealer’s house in order to 
procure cocaine.369 Heinemann drives the group and waits outside. He grows increasingly 
nervous and drives to a nearby gas station.370 But twenty minutes later he returns and discovers 
that the older boys are inside the wrong house, where they have tied up the homeowners and 
are holding guns to their head while demanding the combination to their safe.371 The older 
boys ask Heinemann to help them open the safe and, terrified, he does.372 Heinemann is 
charged with burglary, robbery, larceny, and theft of a firearm.373 
The Heinemann case offers an example of an incident in which the offender was given 
opportunities to avoid the influence of the individualizing factor that produced his conduct – 
coercion by the older boys – but did not take steps to do so. Heinemann may try to argue that 
he was acting under duress because he was so afraid of the older boys but, ultimately, such an 
argument is undermined by his opportunities to escape. While it may be appropriate to take 
into account the coercion applied by the older boys, the offender’s opportunities to escape 
their influence means that the decision-maker can appropriately give such factors little weight.  
The Kimura case, discussed immediately above, might also be viewed as an example of 
this sort. Even if one were persuaded that she genuinely believed the killing of her children was 
not wrongful, one might nonetheless conclude that living in the U.S. for twenty years had given 
her plenty of time and opportunity to appreciate that such a view could be very wrong.  
Subsection (2)(d). Taking Account of Factor Would Communicate Approval or 
Acceptance of an Offensive View. Subsection (d), the final subsection, affords the decision-
maker the opportunity to predictively assess the negative effect on the criminal law’s moral 
credibility if such an offensive factor were allowed to mitigate liability and punishment. Recall 
that, in extreme instances, such a concern can be the basis for excluding such evidence of an 
individualizing factor from trial altogether, under subsection (1)(b). In most cases, however, the 
evidence is likely to be admitted. But this subsection draws the jury's attention to this potential 
problem and asks the jury to take this into account in determining how much, if any, weight to 
be given such an individualizing factor.  
The reasoning underlying this provision is the reasoning sketched in Section I.B., above, 
as well as in subsection (1)(b) of the proposed formulation: to allow condemnable beliefs and 
values to provide the basis for mitigation risks having the criminal law seen as accepting or even 
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approving such beliefs and values. Such a perception would be seriously problematic both 
because it could undermine society’s condemnation of such views and could undermine the 
criminal law’s moral credibility with the community, and thereby its crime-control 
effectiveness, for apparently taking such a position. Thus, where questionable beliefs and 
values are not excluded from admission at trial, the jury should nonetheless take account of the 
potentially detrimental effects – to both society’s norms and to the criminal law’s moral 
credibility – of giving weight to such individualizing factors. 
Consider, for example, the Chen case discussed previously.374 Recall that a Chinese 
immigrant learns that his wife is cheating on him and is so overcome with shame and rage that 
he kills her in what he believes to be a legitimate cultural tradition designed to spiritually purify 
the family tree of a man who has been cuckolded.375 Chen believes that killing his wife in this 
way is the only way to rid himself and his family of the shame of her infidelity.376 He is charged 
with first degree murder.377 
Chen might raise some sort of cultural defense, arguing that he sincerely and honestly 
believed that this cultural practice was not wrong and, in any case, he assumed members of his 
community would interfere and stop him from killing his wife if they thought his conduct 
inappropriate, as was the standard cultural practice.378 The individualizing factor of his 
Cantonese sub-culture would probably not be excluded under Section (1)(b) of the formulation 
because it is not “so abhorrent as to undermine the criminal law’s moral credibility.” But if the 
jury affords him a mitigation based on this factor, they are communicating something more 
sinister to the wider community than civic liberalism or cultural tolerance. Rather, such a 
mitigation would announce that in some circumstances, it is acceptable for a man to kill his wife 
if she cheats on him if such infidelity is specially shameful to him. The deeper implication here is 
a state-sanctioned devaluation of women’s lives: with the criminal law apparently conceding 
some apparent legitimacy to a cultural view that an unfaithful wife may deserve such killing. 
Many in the wider community may be horrified by such a conclusion and may find the apparent 
acceptance of it by the criminal law so troubling as to alter their judgment about the criminal 
law’s moral credibility generally. As the group most in touch with community norms, jurors are 
best suited to fairly fairly judge whether acceptance of a particular individualizing factor would 
be so abhorrent to the community as to undermine the criminal law’s reputation for moral 
justness. 
 
IV. Do the Issues of Partial Individualization Exist in All Adjudication Doctrines? 
 
 Recall from Part I.D. that all principles of adjudication – primarily offense culpability 
requirements, grading mitigations, and excuse defenses – serve a similar purpose of 
determining whether an offender deserves to be punished for their violation of the rules of 
conduct and, if so, the general grade of their blameworthiness and deserved punishment. It 
should be no surprise then to find that the same dynamics at work in the partial-
individualization doctrines discussed above – recklessness, negligence, provocation, extreme 
emotional disturbance, duress, involuntary intoxication, and mistake as to justification – exist in 
many if not all doctrines of adjudication. Do these other doctrines successfully distinguish 
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between individualizing factors that should be taken into account and those that should not? 
Do they provide cautionary guidance for how a qualifying factor should be evaluated, as the 
analysis above provides? It appears that they do not. 
 
A. Complete Individualization: Using a Purely Subjective Requirement 
 
 Some exculpation doctrines are constructed in such a way as to short-circuit any partial 
individualization inquiry by adopting a purely subjective requirement. This is the case, for 
example, when purpose, knowledge, belief, or awareness of risk in recklessness cases is set as 
an offense culpability requirement. If one sees value in the proposed individualization 
formulation’s exclusion of some factors and cautionary guidance in the use of others, then the 
use of purely subjective requirements may be problematic. There may be cases in which an 
offender lacks the required subjective culpability because of individualizing factors that would 
be excluded or at least critically questioned and evaluated under the proposed individualization 
formulation. For example, the proposed formulation would exclude some factors, such as racial 
or gender bias or homophobia, or would insist on a critical evaluation of a variety of other 
factors, such as religious belief or cultural background, yet these same factors may have an 
essential role in shaping an offender’s belief or awareness of risk and thus are uncritically 
allowed to negate a required subjective culpability element. 
 Imagine for example that an immigrant comes from a culture in which property is 
commonly shared. He sees items on a display table outside a store and takes one on the false 
assumption that they are displayed for the purpose of sharing. The offender cannot in fact be 
held liable for theft because he does not satisfy the theft requirement that the taking be with 
purpose to permanently deprive the owner of the property. However, the individualization 
factor analysis presented here suggests that we ought to also ask questions such as: Was the 
actor at fault for not having adjusted to the existing societal customs and rules of his new 
cultural? The purely subjective inquiry of current law allows no such examination.  
 Or consider the case of the devout religious leader Robert Strong, discussed above, who 
stabs one of his parishioners in the honest belief that it will cause no harm because God will 
protect the man. Indeed, the act of stabbing is itself to be a demonstration of God’s power and 
the leader’s absolute devotion and belief.379 If the parishioner dies because the religious leader 
had no intention to kill, or even an awareness of a substantial risk of causing serious bodily 
injury, he cannot be convicted of homicide, aggravated assault, or even attempted murder. But 
wouldn’t we want to ask the kinds of individualizing factor questions that the proposed 
individualization formulation insists upon, such as whether the actor could have been expected 
to have avoided the mistake, with special attention to the seriousness of the offense? Wouldn’t 
we want to ask whether the offender was at fault for forming such a mistaken view in the first 
place or not having corrected it?  
 If an individualizing characteristic is normally to be excluded as inappropriate or to be 
subject to cautionary scrutiny under the proposed analysis and formulation, then the criminal 
law’s use of a completely subjective requirement improperly short-circuits those inquiries. This 
suggests that the proposed individualization analysis and formulation ought to be applied 
broadly to cover all doctrines of adjudication, whether they explicitly present the 
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individualization issue – such as through the use of a “reasonable” person standard – or 
whether they exclude or obscure the issue by adopting a purely subjective requirement.380  
 
B. Obscured Individualization 
 
 Some exculpation doctrines are structured in such a way as to obscure the 
individualization issue. For example, the Model Penal Code involuntary intoxication and insanity 
defenses provide a defense when the jury determines that the actor “lacked substantial 
capacity” to appreciate the criminality or wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct 
to the requirements of law.381 But that broad formulation allows a decision-maker to take into 
account or to exclude from their analysis any factor that they wish, without guidance or 
consistency. 
 Under the proposed analysis and formulation, racism, homophobia, and pedophilic 
tendencies that played a role in the offender’s commission of the offense might be excluded 
from consideration or at least be subject to a variety of cautionary and potentially undermining 
queries, such as: Was the actor at fault for bringing about or maintaining the individualizing 
factor? Did the actor have the capacity to resist the factor’s influence? Yet, where the 
individualizing factor arises in the context of one of the doctrines that obscures consideration of 
the individualization issue, these morally condemnable individualizing factors are not weeded 
out via subjection to cautionary inquiries.  
Recall, for example, the Kingston case in which the defendant was involuntarily 
intoxicated and in that state followed his pedophilic desires to abuse a semiconscious 
teenager.382 Rather than simply asking the Model Penal Code’s involuntary intoxication 
question of whether Kingston had lost “substantial capacity” to control his conduct, wouldn’t 
we want to also ask questions about the strength of the pre-existing pedophilic tendencies and 
his responsibility for having and maintaining them, as the proposed individualization provision 
would do? 
 Thus, if the exclusion of some individualizing factors and the cautionary evaluation of 
others, as provided by the proposed formulation, is appropriate with regard to all adjudication 
doctrines, not just to those that on their face raise the individualizing issue, then again, as with 
the purely subjective inquiries discussed in the previous subsection, the proposed formulation 
ought to be applicable generally, to all doctrines of culpability, mitigation, and excuse.  
 
380 On the other hand, it may well be that we ought not exclude from evidence any individualizing factor in these 
cases of complete individualization – at least in the instance of the definition of culpability requirements of 
purpose, knowledge, belief, and awareness of risk and recklessness. However, we probably do want to condemn 
complete individualization in the case of excuses. All excuses should have some objective limit to the subjective 
inquiry. The culpability requirements just noted, however, present a different issue because they are establishing a 
hierarchy of culpability – ideally, they are making grading distinctions rather than setting a criminal liability cut off. 
On the other hand, current criminal codes tend to do a bad job of using these culpability requirements for grading 
distinctions. They often have a single culpability requirement cut off, such as recklessness, and do not aggravate 
liability for greater culpability (except in the most serious offenses, such as homicide). At the same time, they have 
no lesser offense based upon negligence that will assure some criminal liability even for serious conduct that does 
not meet the subjective awareness of risk requirement of recklessness. As long as this kind of offense structure 
continues to exist in the United States, it may be better to limit the application of a general provision excluding 
certain individualization factors to the operation of general excuses and to bar its application to subjective 
culpability requirements. 
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V. Summary and Conclusion 
 
 To conclude, the answer to the individualization puzzle has eluded scholars for so long 
because, it turns out, other than the two outright exclusions – factors that did not have a 
substantial effect in bringing about the offense and factors the consideration as a basis for 
mitigation would sufficiently appall the community as to undermine the criminal law’s moral 
credibility – there do not exist particular categories of factors that should be taken into account 
and categories of factors that should not. Instead, nearly any (non-excluded) individualizing 
factor may potentially be appropriate to consider depending upon the series of critical  
inquiries identified in the proposed analysis and formulation: the seriousness of the offense, 
the strength of the factor’s influence in bringing about the offense, the capacity of the actor to 
resist the factor’s influence, the actor’s fault in having and keeping the factor, and the  conflict 
with community norms and values in allowing the factor to contribute to mitigation or excuse. 
Our proposal, then, is to allow more liberal introduction of individualizing factors at trial, 
excluding only the two kinds of factors noted. However, while more evidence of individualizing 
factors might be introduced, its use by juries, and by extension parties anticipating what juries 
might do, would be subject to specific cautionary guidance. Juries would not be left to decide 
for themselves, as is done today, whatever comes into their minds regarding the significance of 
a factor. Instead, they would be given a set of fairly detailed inquiries about the factor to guide 
their consideration of it in the case at hand. The proposed statutory formulation would give 
jurors a checklist of inquiries about the individualizing factor, its effect, and the actor’s 
blameworthiness for such effect.  
It is also shown that the individualization issue exists in essentially all doctrines of 
adjudication – culpability requirements, grading mitigations, and excuse defenses – but that the 
existing formulations of these doctrines commonly short-circuit an important inquiry into the 
propriety of allowing such individualization. This suggests that the individualization formulation 
proposed here ought to have general application to all doctrines of adjudication. 
 
